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ABSTRACT
Physical Layer Security Performance Study for Wireless Networks with Cooperative
Jamming
by
Yuanyu Zhang
Due to the rapid development of wireless communication technology and widespread
proliferation of wireless user equipment, wireless networks become indispensable for
lots of applications in daily life. The broadcast nature of wireless medium makes
information exchange in such networks vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks from ma-
licious eavesdroppers, resulting in network security one of the major concerns for
system designers. Physical layer (PHY) security has been proposed as one promising
technology to provide security guarantee for wireless communications, owing to its
unique advantages over traditional cryptography-based mechanisms, like an everlast-
ing security guarantee and no need for costly secret key distribution/management and
complex encryption algorithms. This thesis therefore focuses on the PHY security
performance study for wireless networks with cooperative jamming (a typical PHY
security technique), where non-transmitting helper nodes generate jamming signals
to counteract eavesdropping attacks.
We rst explore the PHY security performances of small-scale wireless networks
with non-colluding (i.e., independently-operating) eavesdroppers, for which we study
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the eavesdropper-tolerance capability (ETC) of a two-hop wireless network with one
source-destination pair, multiple relays and multiple non-colluding eavesdroppers.
We consider two relay selection schemes to forward the packets from the source to
the destination, i.e., random relaying and opportunistic relaying. For both relaying
schemes, we rst derive the secrecy outage probability (SOP) and transmission outage
probability (TOP) of the network by applying the classical Probability Theory. We
then determine the ETC of the network by solving an optimization problem that aims
to maximize the number of eavesdroppers that can be tolerated under a certain SOP
constraint and a certain TOP constraint. Finally, we present extensive simulation
and numerical results to demonstrate the validity of the theoretical analysis and also
to illustrate our theoretical ndings.
We then investigate the PHY security performances of small-scale wireless net-
works with colluding (i.e., cooperatively-operating) eavesdroppers, for which we study
the SOP performance of a two-hop wireless network with one source-destination pair,
multiple relays and multiple colluding eavesdroppers. Based on the classical Prob-
ability Theory, we rst conduct analysis on the SOP of the simple non-colluding
case. For the SOP analysis of the more hazardous M-colluding scenario, where any
M eavesdroppers can combine their observations to decode the message, the tech-
niques of Laplace transform, keyhole contour integral, and Cauchy Integral Theorem
are jointly adopted to work around the highly cumbersome multifold convolution
problem involved in such analysis, such that the related signal-to-interference ratio
modeling for all colluding eavesdroppers can be conducted and thus the correspond-
ing SOP can be analytically determined. Finally, simulation and numerical results
are provided to demonstrate the validity of the theoretical analysis also to illustrate
our theoretical ndings.
Finally, we examine the cooperative jamming design issue in large-scale wireless
networks. Towards this end, we propose a friendship-based cooperative jamming
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scheme to ensure secure communications in a nite Poisson network with one source-
destination pair, multiple legitimate nodes and multiple eavesdroppers distributed
according to two independent and homogeneous Poisson Point Processes (PPP), re-
spectively. The jamming scheme consists of a Local Friendship Circle (LFC) and a
Long-range Friendship Annulus (LFA), where all legitimate nodes in the LFC serve as
jammers, but the legitimate nodes in the LFA are selected as jammers through three
location-based policies. To understand both the security and reliability performances
of the proposed jamming scheme, we rst model the sum interference at any location
in the network by deriving its Laplace transform under two typical path loss scenarios.
With the help of the interference Laplace transform results, we then derive the exact
expression for the TOP and determine both the upper and lower bounds on the SOP,
such that the overall outage performances of the proposed jamming scheme can be
depicted. Finally, we present extensive numerical results to validate the theoretical
analysis of TOP and SOP and also to illustrate the impacts of the friendship-based
cooperative jamming on the network performances.
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
In this chapter, we rst introduce the background of physical layer security and
then we present the objective and main works of this thesis. Finally, we give the
outline and main notations of this thesis.
1.1 Physical Layer Security
With the rapid development of wireless communication technology and the prolif-
eration of wireless user equipment such as smart phones, PDAs, laptops, etc., wireless
networks such as the global cellular networks, satellite communications and wireless
local area networks, become indispensable for lots of applications in our daily life
[1{3]. Due to the broadcast nature of wireless medium, information exchange over
wireless channels is vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks from malicious nodes (i.e.,
eavesdroppers). As a result, security against the eavesdropping attacks becomes one
of the key issues in the design of wireless networks [4{6].
Traditional solutions to protect wireless information transfer from eavesdropping
attacks are mainly based on cryptography, which encrypts information with secret
keys through various kinds of cryptographic protocols, e.g., the Data Encryption
Standard (DES) and RSA algorithm [7]. In cryptography, eavesdroppers are assumed
to have limited computing power, such that even if they capture the encrypted infor-
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mation, they cannot decrypt it without the secret keys. However, as the computing
power of eavesdroppers advances rapidly nowadays, these solutions are facing increas-
ingly high risk of being broken by the relentless brute-force attacks of eavesdroppers
[8, 9]. In addition, the lack of centralized control makes the secret key management
and distribution in wireless networks, especially in decentralized wireless networks,
very costly and complex to be implemented. This necessitates the introduction of
more powerful approaches to ensure wireless network security. Physical layer (PHY)
security has been recognized as one of these approaches to provide a strong form of
security guarantee for wireless networks [10]. The basic principle of PHY security
is to exploit the inherent randomness of noise and wireless channels to ensure the
condentiality of information against any eavesdropper regardless of its computing
power [11]. Compared to the cryptography-based solutions, PHY security can oer
some unique advantages, like an everlasting security guarantee, no need for costly se-
cret key management/distribution and complex cryptographic protocols, and a high
scalability for the next-generation wireless communications [12].
The rst work regarding PHY security goes back to Wyner's paper [13], which
introduced the noisy wiretap channel model. In this model, a legitimate transmitter
wishes to communicate securely with a legitimate receiver over a noisy main chan-
nel, which is wiretapped by an eavesdropper through another noisy channel, called
eavesdropper channel. Wyner's results revealed that a non-zero secrecy rate can be
achieved without using any secret keys between the legitimate transmission pair if
the eavesdropper channel is a degraded version of the main channel. Csiszar and
Korner generalized Wyner's results to a general wiretap channel where the eaves-
dropper channel is not necessarily degraded with respect to the main channel [14].
Their results showed that a non-zero secrecy rate is still achievable when the eaves-
dropper channel is not degraded, by using the technique of channel prex to inject
additional randomness into both the main and eavesdropper channels such that a rel-
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atively better main channel over the eavesdropper channel can be created. Stimulated
by the above observations, extensive research eorts have been devoted to develop-
ing PHY security techniques based on the idea of changing the randomness of both
the main and eavesdroppers channels so as to yield a channel advantage for the main
channel [15, 16]. These techniques mainly includes cooperative jamming [17{20], relay
selection [21{24] and beamforming/precoding [25{28].
Cooperative jamming allows non-transmitting helper nodes to send jamming sig-
nals to improve the security of a given transmitter-receiver pair. The jamming signal
can be Gaussian noise independent of the intended information signal, which will
cause interference to both the intended receiver and the eavesdropper and probabilis-
tically yield a net channel gain for the intended receiver [17]. The jamming signal
can also be some codeword with a certain structure that can be eliminated only at
the legitimate receiver side [19]. Cooperative jamming with Gaussian noise is easy
to implement and requires no channel state information (CSI) about the eavesdrop-
per channel, but it could also hurt the main channel. Cooperative jamming with
structured codeword can certainly improve the security, but it usually needs a com-
plex design of the codeword and relies heavily on the CSI of eavesdropper channels,
which is usually impossible in practice, especially for passive eavesdroppers that only
overhear information without sending any signal in order to conceal themselves.
The basic idea of relay selection is to enlarge the channel advantage of the main
channel over the eavesdropper channel by selecting a relay that can construct a strong
main link but a weak eavesdropper link. Relay selection can be roughly classied
into two categories depending on whether the buers of relays are involved, i.e.,
normal relay selection [21, 22] and buer-aided relay selection [23, 24]. Normal relay
selection usually selects a best relay from all available relays by utilizing the diversity
gain oered by multiple relays. Once the relay is selected, the transmission must
be conducted in a prexed manner (e.g., source-relay-destination manner for a two-
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hop transmission), even if the channel quality of current transmission is relatively
poor. To address this limitation, buer-aided relay selection utilizes the diversity gain
oered by buers of relays to selects a best link from all available links as the current
transmission, which certainly improves the security. Relay selection will not do harm
to the main channel, but it usually also requires the knowledge of eavesdropper CSI.
Besides, the frequent message exchange in the process of relay selection might incur
a relatively high overhead to the network.
The technique of beamforming/precoding is based on multi-antenna signal pro-
cessing. Beamforming refers to transmitting one date stream through multiple an-
tennas, while precoding refers to transmitting multiple data streams simultaneously
over multiple antennas. This technique controls the direction and strength of sig-
nals such that the signal is radiated towards the direction of the intended receiver,
while receivers in other directions can hardly receive the signal. The eect of beam-
forming/precoding in improving the security is obvious, but it usually requires high
coordination (e.g., synchronization) among the nodes involved and high computation
overhead to choose the weight of each antenna, which makes it relatively complex
to be implemented. Besides, this technique also requires the perfect knowledge of
eavesdropper CSI.
Notice that the above techniques focus on changing the channel randomness to
ensure the PHY security, while there are also techniques that focus on exploiting
rather than changing the inherent randomness of wireless channels. A good example
of such kind of techniques is coding [29{31]. Borrowing the idea from stochastic
encoding, the coding technique associates each condential message with multiple
protection messages carrying no information. To transmit a condential message,
the encoder will randomly choose a protection message and encode the condential
message and the protection message together into a single codeword. Assuming the
eavesdropper channel is worse than the main channel, such protection message is
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designed detrimental enough to interfere with the eavesdropper, but still ensuring the
resolvability of the condential message at the intended receiver. This technique can
eectively translate the channel advantage of the main channel into a secrecy rate of
the condential message, but the main challenge is how to construct the codebooks.
Similar to the majority of the above techniques, coding also requires the knowledge
of eavesdropper CSI.
1.2 Objective and Main Works
This thesis adopts the cooperative jamming with Gaussian noise to ensure the
security of wireless communications, considering its possibility of being implemented
in practice without knowing the CSI of eavesdroppers. Our objective is to fully
explore the PHY security performances of wireless networks with cooperative jam-
ming. Towards this end, we rst study the PHY security performances of small-scale
wireless networks with non-colluding eavesdroppers that intercept information inde-
pendently based on their own signal. We then investigate the PHY security perfor-
mances of small-scale wireless networks with colluding eavesdroppers that can ex-
change and combine their signals to cooperatively intercept information. Finally, we
examine the cooperative jamming design issue in large-scale wireless networks. Three
commonly-used PHY security performance metrics are of particular interest, which
are eavesdropper-tolerance capability (ETC) [32], secrecy outage probability (SOP) and
transmission outage probability (TOP) [33]. ETC characterizes the maximum num-
ber of eavesdroppers that can be tolerated by a wireless network. SOP denes the
probability that the message from a transmitter is successfully intercepted by eaves-
droppers. TOP denes the probability that the intended receiver fails to successfully
decode the message from the transmitter. The main works and contributions of this
thesis are summarized in the following subsections.
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1.2.1 PHY Security Performance Study of Small-Scale Wireless Net-
works with Non-Colluding Eavesdroppers
This work focuses on the ETC study of two-hop wireless networks with non-
colluding eavesdroppers. While existing works [32, 34{36] regarding the ETC study
of two-hop wireless networks mainly derived either lower bounds or scaling law results
that depict how the ETC scales up as the network size tends to innity (Please refer
to Section 2.1 for related works), the exact ETC of such networks remains largely
unexplored. In this work, as a rst step towards the study of actual ETC in more
general wireless networks, we study the exact ETC of a two-hop wireless network with
one source-destination pair, multiple relays and multiple non-colluding eavesdroppers.
We consider two relay selection schemes (i.e., random relaying and opportunistic
relaying) to forward packets from the source node to the destination node. The main
contributions of this work can be summarized as follows:
 We rst apply the tools from Probability Theory (e.g., Central Limit Theorem)
to develop theoretical models for both the SOP and TOP analysis of the source-
destination transmission under both the random relaying and opportunistic
relaying schemes.
 We then formulate the ETC problem as an optimization problem that aims to
maximize the number of eavesdroppers that can be tolerated under a certain
SOP constraint and a certain TOP constraint. Based on the Stochastic Ordering
Theory, we then conduct analysis to reveal the monotonicity properties of the
SOP and TOP, based on which we solve the optimization problem and determine
the ETC of the concerned network.
 Extensive simulation results are presented to validate the eciency of our the-
oretical framework and numerical results are also provided to illustrate the
ETC of the concerned network with cooperative jamming under both relaying
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schemes.
1.2.2 PHY Security Performance Study of Small-Scale Wireless Net-
works with Colluding Eavesdroppers
Extensive research eorts have been devoted to exploring the PHY security per-
formances of wireless networks with colluding eavesdroppers in terms of the scaling
laws of secrecy capacity and ETC, secure connection probability, etc. [37{48] (Please
refer to Section 2.2 for related works). These works indicated that eavesdropper col-
lusion represents a more hazardous threat to the security of wireless networks, which
can greatly improve the eavesdroppers' capability of intercepting information. De-
spite the extensive research eorts as mentioned above, the analysis of secrecy outage
performance of wireless network with colluding eavesdroppers remains a technique
challenge. This is mainly due to that such secrecy outage analysis usually involves
highly cumbersome multi-fold convolutions related to the modeling of the probability
density function (pdf)/cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the aggregate Signal-
to-Interference Ratio (SIR) of all colluding eavesdroppers. This work aims to tackle
this challenge and focuses on the SOP study of a two-hop wireless network with one
source-destination pair, multiple relays and multiple colluding eavesdroppers. We
consider two eavesdropping cases, i.e., non-colluding case and M-colluding case where
any M eavesdroppers can combine their observations to decode the message. The
main contributions of this work are summarized as follows:
 Based on the classical Probability Theory, we rst derive the SOP for the simple
non-colluding case, where each eavesdropper works independently and decodes
the message solely based on its own observation.
 For the secrecy outage analysis of the more hazardous M-colluding scenario, the
techniques of Laplace transform, keyhole contour integral and Cauchy Integral
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Theorem are jointly adopted to work around the highly cumbersome multi-fold
convolution involved in such analysis, such that the related SIR modeling for
all colluding eavesdroppers can be conducted and thus the corresponding SOP
can be analytically determined.
 Finally, we provide simulation and numerical results to validate our theoretical
analysis and also to illustrate our theoretical ndings.
1.2.3 Cooperative Jamming Design in Large-Scale Wireless Networks
Due to the rapid proliferation of smart phones, tablets and PDAs, hand-held de-
vices have been an essential integral part of wireless networks. As these devices are
usually carried by human beings, wireless networks, such as mobile ad hoc networks
[49], cellular networks [50] and delay-tolerant networks [51], exhibit some social be-
haviors (e.g., friendship, social trust) nowadays. The potentials of social relationships
among network nodes in improving the quality of many important data communica-
tion services (e.g., content distribution, data sharing and data dissemination) has
been extensively examined (see [52] and references therein). Motivated by this, some
recent eorts have been devoted to the cooperative jamming design with the consid-
eration of social relationships among networks [53, 54] (Please refer to Section 2.3 for
related works).
While the above works represent a signicant process in the study of PHY security-
based secure communication in wireless networks with social relationships, the social
relationships they considered are simply modeled by an indicator variable. Although
these variables are acceptable for characterizing some location-independent social re-
lationships, like social tie and social trust, they may fail to model some important
social properties closely related to geometric properties of networks, e.g., small-world
phenomenon [55, 56]. Also, the network scenarios they considered are quite simple,
which consists of either only one eavesdropper and several jammers or only two clus-
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ters of jammers. To the best of our knowledge, the study of PHY security-based
secure communication in more general large scale wireless networks with small-world
social relationships still remains unknown, which is the scope of this work.
We consider a nite large-scale Poisson network consisting of one source-destination
pair, multiple legitimate nodes and multiple eavesdroppers distributed according to
two independent and homogeneous Poisson Point Processes (PPP), respectively. A
more realistic location-based friendship model is adopted to depict the social relation-
ships among network nodes. The cooperative jamming design in this work takes such
friendship into consideration and exploits the fact that only legitimate nodes that are
friends of the source are willing to serve as jammers. The main contributions of this
work are summarized as follows:
 This paper proposes a friendship-based cooperative jamming scheme to ensure
the PHY security-based secure communication between the transmitter and re-
ceiver. The jamming scheme comprises a Local Friendship Circle (LFC) and a
Long-range Friendship Annulus (LFA), where all legitimate nodes in the LFC
serve as jammers, and three location-based policies are designed to select legit-
imate nodes in the LFA as jammers.
 The TOP and SOP are adopted to model the reliability and security perfor-
mance of the proposed jamming scheme. For the modeling of these performance
metrics, we rst conduct analysis on the sum interference at any location in the
network by deriving its Laplace transforms under the three jammer selection
policies and two typical path loss scenarios [1]. With the help of the interference
Laplace transform results, we then derive the exact expression for the TOP and
determine both the upper and lower bounds on the SOP, such that the overall
outage performances of the proposed jamming scheme can be fully depicted.
 Finally, we present extensive numerical results to validate the theoretical anal-
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ysis of TOP and SOP and also to illustrate the impacts of the friendship-based
cooperative jamming on the network performance.
1.3 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is outlined as follows. Chapter II introduces the
related works of this thesis. In Chapter III, we introduce our work regarding PHY
security performance study of small-scale wireless networks with non-colluding eaves-
droppers. Chapter IV presents the work on PHY security performance study of small-
scale wireless networks with colluding eavesdroppers and Chapter V introduces the
work regarding cooperative jamming design in large-scale wireless networks. Finally,
we conclude this thesis in Chapter VI.
1.4 Notations
The main notations of this thesis are summarized in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Main notations
Symbol Denition
S source node
D destination node
n number of relays
m number of eavesdroppers
M eavesdropper intensity
Ri the i-th relay
Rr selected message relay for random relaying
Rb selected message relay for opportunistic relaying
Ej the j-th eavesdropper
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jhi;jj2 channel gain between nodes i and j
E[] expectation operator
P[] probability operator
Pt common transmit power of source and relay nodes
J jammer set
 noise-generating threshold
SIRi;j signal-to-interference ratio (SIR) from node i to node j
SIRagg aggregate SIR of colluding eavesdroppers
SIRx SIR at location x of a network
 minimum required decoding SIR for legitimate nodes
e minimum required decoding SIR for eavesdroppers
Pto transmission outage probability (TOP)
P ranto TOP for random relaying
P oppto TOP for opportunistic relaying
Pso secrecy outage probability (SOP)
P cso SOP for colluding scenario
P ncso SOP for non-colluding scenario
I(x) interference at node x
"t TOP constraint
"s SOP constraint
Mran eavesdropper-tolerance capability of random relaying
Mopp eavesdropper-tolerance capability of opportunistic relaying
Lf () Laplace transform of function f
B(o;D) two-dimensional nite Poisson Network with radius D
l distance of source-destination pair
 path-loss exponent
11
 Poisson Point Process (PPP) of legitimate nodes
E PPP of eavesdroppers
J PPP of jammers
 density of legitimate nodes
E density of eavesdroppers
A1 local friendship circle (LFC)
A2 long-range friendship annulus (LFA)
R1 radius of LFC (inner radius of LFA)
R2 outer radius of LFA
P() location-based jammer selection policy
() intensity measure of PPP
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CHAPTER II
Related Work
This section introduces the existing works related to our study in this thesis,
including the works on the ETC study of wireless networks, the works on the PHY
security performance study of wireless networks under eavesdropper collusion and the
works on the cooperative jamming schemes with social relationships.
2.1 ETC Study of Two-Hop Wireless Networks
Some recent works have been done on the ETC study of wireless networks. These
works can be classied into two categories according to the network size. For net-
works with innite size or innite number of nodes, the scaling law of ETC against the
per-node throughput was studied in [32] by constructing a highway system. Goeckel
et al. [34] considered a two-hop relay wireless network with one source-destination
pair, multiple relays and eavesdroppers and derived the scaling law of ETC. Sheik-
holeslami et al. [35] then extended this result to a wireless network with multiple
source-destination pairs where cooperative jamming signals are generated from con-
current transmitters. For nite networks, Shen et al. showed the exact lower bound
on the ETC of a two-hop relay wireless network [36]. It is noticed that all the above
works have focused on either the order-sense scaling law results for innite networks,
or bounds for nite networks. Such order sense results or bounds are certainly im-
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portant but cannot reect the the actual ETC of more practical network scenarios
with nite nodes and nite size, which is more important for the system designers.
However, to the best of our knowledge, the exact result of ETC has been unexplored
yet, mainly due to the challenges posed by modeling the spatial correlation of the
signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) in multiple hops and the complexity in
determining the distribution of interference.
2.2 PHY Security Performance Study of Wireless Networks
with Colluding eavesdroppers
The security performance study of wireless communications under eavesdropper
collusion and physical layer security can be classied into two categories, depending
on the considered network scenario.
For two-hop wireless networks, the secure connection probability, i.e., the prob-
ability that the secrecy rates in two hops are both positive, was investigated in [37]
to study when a relay is needed to establish a more secure connection. The au-
thors in [38] proposed novel relay strategies to neutralize information leakage from
each user to the colluding eavesdroppers by choosing the forwarding matrix of an
amplify-and-forward relay in a multi-antenna non-regenerative relay-assisted multi-
carrier interference channel. For a multiuser peer-to-peer (MUP2P) relay network
with multiple source-destination pairs, multiple relays and a colluding eavesdropper
with multiple antennas, the authors in [39] optimized the transmit power of the source
and the beamforming weights of the relays jointly to maximize the secrecy rate sub-
ject to the minimum signal-to-interference-noise-ratio constraint at each user and the
individual and total power constraints. In [40], Vasudevan et al. considered a very
similar system model with opportunistic relaying and cooperative jamming schemes
as in this thesis, whereas they focused on the scaling law of ETC.
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For other wireless networks, the scaling law of secrecy capacity was examined
for large-scale networks in [41, 42] as network size tends to innity. The secrecy-
constrained connectivity property of large multi-hop wireless networks with colluding
eavesdroppers was considered in [43]. The problem of nding a secure minimum en-
ergy routing path of K hops between two nodes in an arbitrary wireless network was
considered in [44], subject to constraints on the end-to-end successful eavesdropping
probability and throughput over the path. The security scheme design issue and the
related optimization problem under eavesdropper collusion also attracted consider-
able attention for various network scenarios [45, 46]. The SOP i.e., the probability
that instantaneous secrecy rate between a transmitter-receiver pair is below some
threshold, was investigated for various stochastic networks [47, 48].
2.3 Cooperative Jamming Scheme with Social Relationships
Some recent eorts have been devoted to the study of PHY security-based se-
cure communication in wireless networks with social relationships. Wang et al. [53]
considered a D2D communication scenario, where the head of two D2D user (DUE)
clusters wish to communicate with the help of an intermediate Decode-and-Forward
relay. The communication security is guaranteed by the cooperative jamming scheme,
where multiple friendly jammers send jamming signals to suppress eavesdroppers, and
the social relationship is modeled by a social trust parameter  2 [0; 1]. Two sets of
jammers are selected from DUEs with social trust above some threshold min. With
the consideration of power constraint, the authors studied the optimal selection of
relay and jammers to maximize the secrecy rate of DUE transmission and also to
ensure a required SINR level to cellular users. Tang et al. [54] considered a wireless
network consisting of one source-destination pair, a set of cooperative jammers and
one eavesdropper. Cooperative jamming is adopted to ensure the security and the
concept of social tie is introduced to model the social relationship between jammers
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and the source/destination. The strength of social tie of the n-th jammer is denoted
by an 2 f0; 1g, where 1 (0) indicates that the jammer is (is not) willing to participate
in the cooperative jamming. The authors modeled the decision problem of jammers
as a social tie-based cooperative jamming game and then explored the secrecy outage
performance of the source-destination pair by computing the Nash equilibrium of the
game.
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CHAPTER III
Physical Layer Security Performance Study of
Small-Scale Wireless Networks with
Non-Colluding Eavesdroppers
This chapter focuses on the PHY security performance study of small-scale wire-
less network with non-colluding eavesdroppers, for which we study the eavesdropper-
tolerance capability (ETC) of a two-hop wireless network with non-colluding eaves-
droppers. We consider two relaying schemes, i.e., the random relaying which ran-
domly selects a relay from the available relays and the opportunistic relaying which
selects the best relay based on the link conditions of each relay. For both relaying
schemes, we rst theoretically analyze the performances of secrecy outage probability
(SOP) and transmission outage probability (TOP), based on which we further explore
the ETC of the network with both relaying schemes under the constraints of both
SOP and TOP. Finally, simulation and numerical results are provided to validate our
theoretical analysis and also to illustrate our theoretical ndings.
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Figure 3.1: System scenario: a source S is transmitting messages to a destination
D with the help of relays R1; R2;    ; Rn (n = 6 in this gure) while eavesdroppers
E1; E2;    ; Em (m = 5 in this gure) are attempting to intercept the messages. In
this gure, R4 is the message relay and R2, R5 are jammers.
3.1 System Model
3.1.1 Network Model
As depicted in Figure 3.1, we consider a two-hop wireless network consisting of a
source node S, a destination node D, n legitimate half-duplex relays R1; R2;    ; Rn
that cannot transmit and receive at the same time and m passive eavesdroppers
E1; E2;    ; Em of unknown channel information. The eavesdroppers are assumed
non-colluding such that they intercept information solely based on their own received
signal. We assume that the direct link between S and D does not exist due to deep
fading and thus S needs to transmit messages to D via one of the relays. Meanwhile,
some of the remaining n   1 relays will be selected as jammers to generate random
Gaussian noise to suppress the eavesdroppers during the transmission. We aim to
ensure both secure and reliable transmissions from S to D against the eavesdroppers.
Time is slotted and a slow, at, block Rayleigh fading environment is assumed,
where the channel remains static for one time slot and varies randomly and inde-
pendently from slot to slot. The channel coecient from a transmitter A to a re-
ceiver B is modeled by a complex zero-mean Gaussian random variable hA;B and
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thus jhA;Bj2 is an exponential random variable. We assume that jhA;Bj2 = jhB;Aj2 and
E
jhA;Bj2 = 1, where E   stands for the expectation operator. All channel gains
jhS;Rij2, jhRi;Dj2, jhS;Ej j2, jhRi;Ej j2 and jhRi;Rk j2 for i 2 [1; n], k 2 [1; n]; k 6= i and
j 2 [1;m] are assumed independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). It is assumed
that the source S and the relays transmit with the same power Pt. In addition, we
assume that the network is interference-limited and thus the noise at each receiver is
negligible.
3.1.2 Relaying Schemes and Cooperative Jamming
To ensure the two-hop transmission between S and D, we consider the following
transmission protocol which involves both the relay selection and cooperative jamming
schemes:
1. Channel measurement: In this step, the source S rst broadcasts a pilot
signal such that each relay can measure the channel coecient from S to itself.
Similarly, the destination D broadcasts a pilot signal to allow each relay to
measure the channel coecient from D to itself. We assume that each relay and
eavesdropper can exactly measure the channel coecients from its observations.
Hence, each relay Ri, i = 1; 2;    ; n exactly knows hS;Ri and hRi;D, and each
eavesdropper Ej, j = 1; 2;    ;m exactly knows hS;Ej and hD;Ej .
2. Relay selection and declaration: A relay is selected from the n relays as the
message relay. We use i to denote the index of the message relay. The relay Ri
then broadcasts a pilot signal to declare itself as the message relay. After this
step, each relay Ri, i = 1; 2;    ; n; i 6= i and eavesdropper Ej, j = 1; 2;    ;m
exactly knows hRi;Ri and hEj ;Ri , respectively.
3. Message transmission from S to Ri: In this step, the source S transmits
a message to Ri . At the same time, the cooperative jamming technique
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is adopted to ensure the security of this transmission. This technique allows
relays in the set J1 = fRi 6= Ri : jhRi;Ri j2 < g to generate random Gaussian
noise in order to suppress the eavesdroppers, where  is the noise-generating
threshold.
4. Message transmission from Ri to D: In this step, the message relay Ri
sends the message to the destination D. Cooperative jamming is also used in
this step and relays in the set J2 = fRi 6= Ri : jhRi;Dj2 < g generate random
Gaussian noise to assist the message transmission.
In Step 2, we consider two relay selection schemes. The rst one is the random
relaying, which randomly selects a relay from R1; R2;    ; n as the message relay.
We use Rr to denote the message relay selected by this scheme. The second one is
the opportunistic relaying, which selects a best relay from R1; R2;    ; Rn that
maximizes the minimum of the source-relay channel gain and relay-destination chan-
nel gain (i.e., minfjhS;Rij2; jhRi;Dj2g. We use Rb to denote the relay selected by the
opportunistic relaying scheme and
b

= argmax
i2[1;n]
minfjhS;Rij2; jhRi;Dj2g:
Remark 1 It is notable that the above relay selection requires only the channel state
information (CSI) of legitimate channels, which can be estimated by the pilot signals
(e.g., ready-to-send (RTS) packet from the source, clear-to-send (CTS) packet from
the destination) in practice [57].
Suppose that the source S is sending signal x to the message relay Ri during
some slot. At the same time, the relay Ri in the set J1 is sending jamming signal xi.
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The received signal at the message relay is then given by
yRi =
p
PthS;Rix+
X
i2J1
p
PthRi;Rixi; (3.1)
and the received signal at the eavesdropper Ej; j = 1; 2;    ;m is given by
yEj =
p
PthS;Ejx+
X
i2J1
p
PthRi;Ejxi; (3.2)
Hence, the received signal-to-interference ratio (SIR) at Ri and at Ej in the rst hop
can be given by
SIRS;Ri =
jhS;Ri j2P
i2J1 jhRi;Ri j2
; SIRS;Ej =
jhS;Ej j2P
i2J1 jhRi;Ej j2
: (3.3)
Similarly, suppose that the message relay Ri is forwarding the received signal
x to the destination D in the second hop and the relay Ri in the set J2 is sending
jamming signal xi concurrently. The received signal at D is given by
yD =
p
PthRi ;Dx+
X
i2J2
p
PthRi;Dxi; (3.4)
and the received signal at the eavesdropper Ej; j = 1; 2;    ;m is given by
yEj =
p
PthRi ;Ejx+
X
i2J2
p
PthRi;Ejxi; (3.5)
Hence, the received SIR at D and at Ej in the second hop can be given by
SIRRi ;D =
jhRi ;Dj2P
i2J2 jhRi;Dj2
; SIRRi ;Ej =
jhRi ;Ej j2P
i2J2 jhRi;Ej j2
: (3.6)
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3.1.3 Problem Formulation
In this subsection, we rst formulate the transmission outage probability and se-
crecy outage probability of the concerned network, based on which we then formulate
the ETC as an optimization problem.
In practice, a minimum SIR is usually required for receivers to correctly decode
the received signal. We dene  the minimum required SIR for legitimate nodes
and e that for eavesdroppers. Consider the transmission in a single hop (e.g., the
rst hop). We say that transmission outage in this hop happens if the message relay
cannot correctly decode the message (i.e., SIRS;Ri < ) and secrecy outage happens
if at least one of the eavesdroppers (say Ej) can correctly decode the message (i.e.,
SIRS;Ej  e). Generalizing these two outages to the case of two-hop transmission
from S to D, we say that transmission (secrecy) outage for the two-hop transmission
occurs if the transmission in either hop suers from transmission (secrecy) outage.
Thus, the transmission outage probability (TOP) for the two-hop transmission
is thus dened as the probability that the transmission from S to D suers from
transmission outage and can be formulated as
Pto = P (SIRS;Ri <  or SIRRi ;D < ) ; (3.7)
where P() represents the probability operator. The secrecy outage probability
(SOP) is dened as the probability that the transmission from S to D suers from
secrecy outage and can be formulated as
Pso = P
 
m[
j=1

SIRS;Ej  e
	
or
m[
j=1

SIRRi ;Ej  e
	!
: (3.8)
Since security and reliability are two important metrics in network design, we
use an SOP constraint "s and a TOP constraint "t to represent the security and
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reliability requirements of the two-hop transmission. We say that the transmission
from S to D is secure if and only if Pso  "s and reliable if and only if Pto  "t.
Based on the denitions of security and reliability, we dene the eavesdropper-
tolerance capability (ETC) as the maximum number of eavesdroppers that can be
tolerated such that the transmission from S to D is both reliable and secure. From
the formulation of SOP and the security constraint, we can see that the maximum
number of eavesdroppers that can be tolerated under only the security constraint "s
is a function of the noise-generating threshold  for a given n. We useM() to denote
this function, which is given by
M() = maxfm : Pso(n;m; )  "sg:
Taking the reliability constraint "t into consideration, we can now formulate the ETC
as the following optimization problem
maximize

M()
subject to Pto(n; )  "t;   0
"t 2 [0; 1]; "s 2 [0; 1]:
(3.9)
The ETC can thus be determined as the maximum of M().
3.2 Outage Performance Analysis
In this section, we theoretically analyze the TOP and SOP of the two-hop trans-
mission from S to D under both the random relaying and opportunistic relaying.
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3.2.1 TOP Analysis
We rst derive the analytical expression for the TOP of the random relaying and
then given an accurate approximation to the TOP of the opportunistic relaying.
3.2.1.1 TOP for Random Relaying
The expression for the TOP of the random relaying is summarized in the following
theorem.
Theorem III.1 Consider the network scenario in Figure 3.1 with cooperative jam-
ming scheme. The TOP P ranto under the random relaying scheme can be given by
P ranto = 1 

e  +
1  e (1+)
1 + 
2n 2
; (3.10)
where n is the number of relays,  is the noise-generating threshold in cooperative
jamming and  is the minimum required SIR for legitimate receivers to correctly
decode the source message.
Proof 1 Using the fact that SIRS;Rr and SIRRr;D are i.i.d., we can write the TOP in
(3.7) as
P ranto = 1  P (SIRS;Rr  )2 : (3.11)
Thus, we only focus on deriving P (SIRS;Rr  ), which is
P (SIRS;Rr  ) = P
 jhS;Rr j2P
i2J1 jhRi;Rr j2
 

:
Since the message relay Rr is randomly selected from n relays, jhS;Rr j2 is exponentially
distributed with unit mean. Next, we consider the term
P
i2J1 jhRi;Rr j2 which is the
summation of random variables less than  among n  1 i.i.d. random variables. We
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rst dene a new random variable
U
 jhRi;Rr j2 = 1  jhRi;Rr j2 <   jhRi;Rr j2
for each Ri, where 1() is an indicator variable that equals 1 if jhRi;Rr j2 <  and 0
otherwise. We then have
X
i2J1
jhRi;Rr j2 =
nX
i=1;i6=r
U(jhRi;Rr j2);
which becomes the summation of n 1 i.i.d. random variables. Notice that U(jhRi;Rr j2)
is a mixed random variable, and the distribution of its discrete part can be given by
P (U(jhRi;Rr j2) = 0) = e  and the distribution of its continuous part can be given by
fU>0(u) =
8><>: 0; u  e u; 0 < u <  :
Now, we can derive the probability P (SIRS;Rr  ) as
P (SIRS;Rr  ) = EfU(jhRi;Rr j2)g
"
P
 
jhS;Rr j2  
 
nX
i=1;i6=r
U(jhRi;Rr j2)
!!#
= EfU(jhRi;Rr j2)g
h
e (
Pn
i=1;i6=r U(jhRi;Rr j2))
i
= EfU(jhRi;Rr j2)g
"
nY
i=1;i 6=r
e U(jhRi;Rr j
2)
#
=
nY
i=1;i6=r
EU(jhRi;Rr j2)
h
e U(jhRi;Rr j
2)
i
=
nY
i=1;i6=r

1  e  +
Z 
0
e ufU>0(u)du

=

e  +
1  e (1+)
1 + 
n 1
: (3.12)
Substituting (3.12) into (3.11) completes the proof.
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3.2.1.2 TOP for Opportunistic Relaying
Before determining the TOP for the opportunistic relaying, we rst dene the
total interference at the legitimate receiver in two phases by I(Rb) =
P
i2J1 jhRi;Rbj2
and I(D) =
P
i2J2 jhRi;Dj2. Then, we establish the following lemmas regarding the
probability distribution of I(Rb), I(D) and an important joint probability of the
channel gains in two phases, which is critical in deriving P oppto .
Lemma 1 For one message transmission from S to D, the total interference I(Rb)
and I(D) are i.i.d., and can be approximated by a normal random variable with a
probability distribution function (pdf)
f(x)  f^(x) = e
  (x )2
22

p
2
;
where
 = (n  1) 1  (1 + )e 
is the mean and
 =
r
(n  1)
h
1   2e    (1 + )2e 2
i
is the standard derivation of the normal random variable.
Lemma 2 For one message transmission from S to D, the joint probability that
jhS;Rb j2 is greater than some constant x  0 and jhRb;Dj2 is greater than some constant
y  0 can be determined as
P
 jhS;Rbj2  x; jhRb;Dj2  y
= 1  (1  e 2maxfx;yg)n + ne maxfx;yg [' (n;minfx; yg)  ' (n;maxfx; yg)] ;
where '(n; x) = e x2F1
 
1
2
; 1  n; 3
2
; e 2x

and 2F1 is the Gaussian hypergeometric
function.
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Remark 2 Since S and relays transmit with the same power Pt, we can omit the Pt
in I(Rb) and I(D) in Lemma 1. The proofs of the above lemmas can be found in
Appendix A.1.
For a two-hop wireless network with the opportunistic relaying scheme, we are
now ready to derive its TOP P oppto of the end-to-end transmission based on Lemma 1
and Lemma 2.
Theorem III.2 Consider the network scenario in Figure 3.1 with the cooperative
jamming scheme. The TOP P oppto under the opportunistic relaying can be given by
P oppto  2
Z (n 1)
0
g(n; ; x)f^(x)



x  


  

 


dx
 2
Z (n 1)
0
Z x
0
ne x'(n; y)f^(x)f^(y)dydx; (3.13)
where where n is the number of relays,  is the noise-generating threshold in co-
operative jamming,  is the minimum required SIR for legitimate receivers to cor-
rectly decode the source message, f^(x) = e
  (x )
2
22

p
2
, (x) = 1p
2
R x
 1 e
  t2
2 dt,  =
(n   1) [1  (1 + )e  ],  = p(n  1) [1   2e    (1 + )2e 2 ], g(n; ; x) = (1  
e 2x)n+ne x' (n; x), '(n; x) = e x2F1
 
1
2
; 1  n; 3
2
; e 2x

and 2F1 is the Gaussian
hypergeometric function.
Proof 2 According to the denition of TOP in (3.7), we have
P oppto = 1  P (SIRS;Rb  ; SIRRb;D  )
= 1  P  jhS;Rbj2  I(Rb); jhRb;Dj2  I(D) ;
where I(Rb) and I(D) are the total interferences in the rst hop and second hop,
respectively. Applying the law of total probability, we have
P oppto = 1  EI(Rb);I(D)

P
 jhS;Rbj2  I(Rb); jhRb;Dj2  I(D) (3.14)
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Applying Lemma 1, we have
P oppto  1 
Z (n 1)
0
Z (n 1)
0
P
 jhS;Rbj2  x; jhRb;Dj2  y f^(x)f^(y)dydx
Applying Lemma 2, we have
P oppto = 2
Z (n 1)
0
Z x
0

(1  e 2x)n   ne x ['(n; y)  '(n; x)]	 f^(x)f^(y)dydx
= 2
Z (n 1)
0
Z x
0
g(n; ; x)f^(x)f^(y)dydx
 2
Z (n 1)
0
Z x
0
ne x'(n; y)f^(x)f^(y)dydx
= 2
Z (n 1)
0
g(n; ; x)f^(x)



x  


  

 


dx (3.15)
 2
Z (n 1)
0
Z x
0
ne x'(n; y)f^(x)f^(y)dydx;
which completes the proof.
3.2.2 SOP Analysis
From the denition of SOP in (3.8), we have
Pso = P
 
m[
j=1

SIRS;Ej  e
	
or
m[
j=1

SIRRi ;Ej  e
	!
(3.16)
= 1  P
 
m\
j=1

SIRS;Ej < e
	
;
m\
j=1

SIRRi ;Ej < e
	!
= 1 
"
P
 
m\
j=1

SIRS;Ej < e
	!#2
= 1 
"
P
 
m\
j=1
 jhS;Ej j2P
i2J1 jhRi;Ej j2
< e
!#2
:
It can be seen from (3.16) that actually the SOP under both relaying schemes is
identical. The analytical result of the SOP is summarized in the following theorem.
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Theorem III.3 Consider the network scenario in Figure 3.1 with cooperative jam-
ming scheme. The SOP Pso under both the random relaying scheme and the oppor-
tunistic relaying scheme can be given by
Pso = 1 
0@ mX
k=1

m
k

( 1)k
"
(1  e  )

1
1 + e
k
+ e 
#n 11A2 ; (3.17)
where m is the number of eavesdroppers, n is the number of relays,  is the noise-
generating threshold in cooperative jamming and e is the minimum required SIR for
eavesdroppers to correctly decode the source message.
Proof 3 According to (3.16), we need to derive the probability
P
 
m\
j=1
 jhS;Ej j2P
i2J1 jhRi;Ej j2
< e
!
:
Note that the number of noise-generating relays in the rst hop jJ1j follows the bi-
nomial distribution B(n   1; 1   e  ). We dene the event that there are s noise-
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generating relays in the rst hop (i.e., jJ1j = s) by Bs and thus we have
P
 
m\
j=1
 jhS;Ej j2P
i2J1 jhRi;Ej j2
< e
!
(3.18)
=
n 1X
s=0
P
 
m\
j=1
 jhS;Ej j2P
i2J1 jhRi;Ej j2
< e
 Bs!P(Bs)
(a)
=
n 1X
s=0
mY
j=1
P
 jhS;Ej j2P
i2J1 jhRi;Ej j2
< e
BsP(Bs)
(b)
=
n 1X
s=0
mY
j=1
E
h
1  e e
P
i2J1 jhRi;Ej j
2
i
P(Bs)
(c)
=
n 1X
s=0
mY
j=1
 
1 
Y
i2J1
E
h
e ejhRi;Ej j
2
i!
P(Bs)
=
n 1X
s=0

1 

1
1 + e
sm
n  1
s

(1  e  )s(e  )n 1 s
=
mX
k=1

m
k

( 1)k
"
(1  e  )

1
1 + e
k
+ e 
#n 1
;
where (a) follows since all the fSIRS;Ej ; j = 1;    ;mg are conditionally independent
given the event Bs, (b) follows by applying the law of total probability and the ex-
pectation is computed with respect to fjhRi;Ej j2; i 2 J1g and (c) follows since all the
jhRi;Ej j2 are i.i.d.. Therefore, (3.17) follows after substituting (3.18) into (3.16).
3.3 Eavesdropper-Tolerance Capability Analysis
In this section, we determine the ETC of the twp-hop relay wireless network
under the TOP and SOP constraints for both the random relaying and opportunistic
relaying schemes. For each relaying scheme, we rst analyze the properties of the
optimization problems in (3.9) and then solve the related optimization problem to
obtain the ETC.
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3.3.1 ETC for Random Relaying
It can be observed from (3.9) that the noise-generating threshold  is a critical
parameter in determining the ETC. A too large  will do harm to the legitimate trans-
mission, while a too small  is not enough to suppress the eavesdroppers. Therefore,
nding an optimal  is the key step to solving our considered problem. Before solving
the problem, we rst establish two lemmas regarding the monotonicity of P ranto and
Pso, respectively.
Lemma 3 The TOP for the random relaying P ranto increases monotonically as the
noise-generating threshold  increases.
Proof 4 Dene the term e  + 1 e
 (1+)
1+
in the expression of P ranto in Theorem III.1
as a function h(). We can easily compute its derivative as e (1+)   e  , which is
less than 0 for  > 0. Thus, P ranto increases monotonically as  increases.
Before giving the lemma regarding the monotonicity Pso, we establish the following
lemma based on the Stochastic Ordering in [58].
Lemma 4 Let X and Y be two N-dimensional random vectors such that
P(X 2 U)  P(Y 2 U) for all upper sets U 2 RN :
Then X is said to be smaller than Y in the usual stochastic order (denoted by X st
Y). And for all increasing function , we always have E[(X)]  E[(Y)].
Based on the above lemma, we are now ready to establish the following lemma in
terms of the monotonicity of SOP with respect to  and m.
Lemma 5 The SOP Pso decreases monotonically as the noise-generating threshold 
increases, but increases as the number of eavesdroppers m increases.
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Proof 5 Notice that the step following (c) in (3.18) can also be written as
E
"
1 

1
1 + e
jJ1j#
;
where the expectation is with respect to jJ1j. For any 0  1 < 2, we use two random
variables jJ 11 j and jJ 21 j to represent the number of noise-generating relays in the rst
phase, where jJ 11 j  B(n  1; 1  e 1) and jJ 21 j  B(n  1; 1  e 2). It is shown in
[59] that jJ 11 j st jJ 21 j. Applying Lemma 4, we can see that
E
"
1 

1
1 + e
jJ 11 j#
< E
"
1 

1
1 + e
jJ 21 j#
:
Therefore, the SOP Pso decreases as  increases.
Next, we consider the step following (c) in (3.18) again. It is easy to see that the
term 1 ( 1
1+e
)l 2 [0; 1). Thus, the term

1 

1
1+e
lm
decreases with m. Therefore,
the SOP Pso increases as m increases.
Based on Lemma 3 and Lemma 5, we can give the ETC of the random relaying
in the following theorem.
Theorem III.4 Consider the network scenario in Figure 3.1 with the random re-
laying scheme. The ETC of the concerned network with n relays under a security
constraint "s and a reliability constraint "t is
Mran = maxfm : G(m;n;  ran) 
p
1  "sg;
where G(m;n;  ran) =
Pm
k=1
 
m
k

( 1)k

(1  e ran)

1
1+e
k
+ e 

ran
n 1
,  ran is the
solution of P ranto = "t and P
ran
to is given in Theorem III.1.
Proof 6 As shown in the formulation of ETC in (3.9), we need to nd the optimal
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 that maximizes Mran(), where
Mran() = maxfm : G(m;n; ) 
p
1  "sg
according to its denition. Since the TOP P ranto increases with  according to Lemma
3, in order to guarantee the reliability (i.e., P ranto  "t),  must take values in the
region [0; m], where m is the solution of P
ran
to = "t.
Next, we need to prove that m is the optimal  (i.e.,

ran = m) that achieves the
ETC. That is, for any  2 [0; m), we always have Mran()  Mran(m). Now we
prove it by contradiction. Suppose there exists a  0 2 [0; m) such that Mran( 0) 
Mran(m) + 1. By Lemma 5, it can be seen that G(m;n; ) increases with  , while
decreasing with m. Thus, it is easy to see that
G(Mran(m) + 1; n; m) <
p
1  "s;
since Mran(m) is the largest m satisfying G(m;n; m) 
p
1  "s. Thus, we have
G(Mran(m) + 1; n; 
0) < G(Mran(m) + 1; n; m) <
p
1  "s
and
G(Mran(m) + 1; n; 
0)  G(Mran( 0); n;  0) 
p
1  "s:
We can see a contradiction from the above two inequalities. Thus, for any  2 [0; m)
we always have Mran() Mran(m) (i.e.,  ran = m) and thus the ETC is achieved
at  ran.
3.3.2 ETC for Opportunistic Relaying
Following the idea of determining the ETC of the random relaying, we rst estab-
lish the following lemma regarding the monotonicity of P oppto with respect to  .
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Lemma 6 The TOP P oppto for the opportunistic relaying scheme increases as  in-
creases.
Proof 7 For any 0 < 1 < 2, we use random vector I1 = (I(Rb)
1; I(D)1) to represent
the interferences in two hops when the noise-generating threshold is 1 and I2 =
(I(Rb)
2; I(D)2) to represent those for 2. For any upper set
U = (I(Rb); I(D))I(Rb)  x  0; I(D)  y  0	 ;
we always have
P(I1 2 U) = P(I(Rb)1  x)P(I(D)1  y)
and
P(I2 2 U) = P(I(Rb)2  x)P(I(D)2  y):
It is easy to see that P(I(Rb)1  x) < P(I(Rb)2  x) and P(I(D)1  y) < P(I(D)2 
y), since more interference can be generated as  increases. Therefore, we have
P(I1 2 U) < P(I2 2 U) and then I1 st I2 according to Lemma 4. Dene the
term P (jhS;Rbj2  I(Rb); jhRb;Dj2  I(D)) in (3.14) by  (I) which decreases as I
increases, where I = (I(Rb); I(D)). Thus, we have E[ (I1)] > E[ (I2)] according to
Lemma 4. That is, for any 0 < 1 < 2, we always have P
opp
to (1) < P
opp
to (2), which
indicates the TOP P oppto increases with  .
By applying Lemma 5 and Lemma 6, we can establish the following theorem for
the ETC achieved by the opportunistic relaying.
Theorem III.5 Consider the network scenario in Figure 3.1 with the opportunistic
relaying scheme. The ETC of the concerned network with n relays under a security
constraint "s and a reliability constraint "t is
Mopp = maxfm : G(m;n;  opp) 
p
1  "sg;
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where G(m;n;  opp) =
Pm
k=1
 
m
k

( 1)k

(1  e opp)

1
1+e
k
+ e 

opp
n 1
and  opp is
the solution of P oppto = "t and P
opp
to is given in Theorem III.2.
Proof 8 The proof follows the same idea in proving the ETC of the random relaying,
so we omit it here.
3.4 Numerical Results and Discussions
In this section, we rst verify our theoretical model for TOP and SOP through
extensive simulations. We then explore the impact of network parameters on the
TOP and SOP performances of both relaying scheme. Finally, we examine explore
how the number of relays n, the SIR thresholds  and e, the security constraint "s
and the reliability constraint "t aect the ETC of both relaying schemes.
3.4.1 Model Validation
A simulator was developed in C++ to simulate the message transmission from
the source S to the destination D based on the relaying and cooperative jamming
schemes introduced in Section 3.1, which is now available at [60]. The total number of
end-to-end transmissions from S to D is xed as 100000. The simulated TOP (SOP)
is calculated as the ratio of the number of transmissions suering from transmission
outage (secrecy outage) to the total number of transmissions 100000. To verify the
validity of the expressions for the TOP of both relaying schemes, we vary the number
of relays n from 10 to 490 with an interval of 20 and consider three dierent settings in
terms of the noise-generating threshold  and the minimum required SIR , i.e., ( =
0:1,  = 2), ( = 0:1,  = 3) and ( = 0:15,  = 2). For the validation of the SOP, we
set the minimum required SIR as e = 0:5 and vary n from 20 to 800 with an interval
of 20 and also consider three dierent network scenarios of (m = 100;  = 0:05), (m =
100;  = 0:1) and (m = 500;  = 0:05), which correspond to sparse eavesdroppers with
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Figure 3.2: TOP vs. the number of relays n for dierent settings of  and .
low interference, sparse eavesdroppers with high interference, and dense eavesdroppers
with low interference. The corresponding simulated results and theoretical results are
summarized in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3. Notice that simulations with other settings
can be easily performed by our simulator as well.
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e = 0:5.
Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 indicate clearly that the simulated results match nicely
with the theoretical ones for both TOP and SOP, so our theoretical model can be used
to eectively explore the TOP and SOP performances as well as the eavesdropper-
tolerance performance of the concerned network with the opportunistic (random)
relaying and cooperative jamming schemes.
3.4.2 TOP and SOP Performance
We now explore the impact of the number of relays n, the noise-generating thresh-
old  and the minimum required SIR  on the impact of TOP under both relaying
schemes. We can see from Figure 3.2 that the TOP under both relaying schemes
(i.e., P oppto and P
ran
to ) increases with the number of relays n. This is because that
adding more relays to the network has no impact on the link quality determined by
the random relaying, but will generate more interference at the intended receiver.
For the opportunistic relaying scheme, although adding more relays will improve the
diversity gain oered by the relays and thus improve the link quality, but the inter-
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ference from the noise-generating relays dominates the trend of the received SIR at
legitimate receivers. By comparing these three curves in Figure 3.2, it can also be
observed that both P oppto and P
ran
to increases as  increases. This is due to the reason
that more interferences will be generated at the intended receiver for lager  , and thus
it is more dicult for the receivers to successfully recover the messages. We can also
observe that for both relaying scheme, the TOP increases as the minimum required
SIR  increases. This is because that a larger  means a poorer decoding ability for
the intended receivers, thus resulting a larger TOP. Finally, comparing the results in
Figure 3.2a and Figure 3.2b, we can see that the opportunistic relaying achieves a
much smaller TOP than the random relaying, due to the improved link quality from
S to D by selecting the best relay. We now explore the impact of the number of relays
n, the noise-generating threshold  and the number of eavesdroppers m on the impact
of SOP. We can see from Figure 3.3 that Pso decreases as n increases. This is because
more interferences can be generated at the eavesdroppers by distributing more relays
for a specic  . By comparing these three curves in Figure 3.3, it can also be observed
that Pso increases as m increases while decreases as  increases. This is intuitive since
distributing more eavesdroppers by the adversary would post more potential threats
to the end-to-end transmission and increasing  would generate more interferences at
the eavesdroppers, so it is more dicult for them to successfully decode the messages.
3.4.3 Eavesdropper-tolerance Performances
Based on the SOP and TOP models, we now explore the ETC performance of
both relaying schemes for opportunistic relaying scheme. To illustrate the impact of
the security constraint "s and the reliability constraint "t on the ETC of both relaying
scheme, we show in Figure 3.4 the behavior of ETC vs. "t and "s for the network
scenario of n = 2000; e = 0:5. For the random relaying scheme, we set  = 1:0, while
for the opportunistic relaying scheme, we set  = 10, which means that we consider
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 = 10.
Figure 3.4: ETC vs. reliability constraint "t and security constraint "s for n = 2000
and e = 0:5.
more powerful intended receivers in terms of the decoding ability for the random
relaying scheme. Notice that both values of  imply that the legitimate receivers has
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a worse decoding ability than the eavesdroppers. We can observe from Figure 3.4
that the ETC of both relaying schemes increases as "t and "s increase. This reects
that the network can tolerate more eavesdroppers by relaxing either the security or
reliability constraint. A careful observation of both gures in Figure 3.4 indicates
a clear trade-o between the reliability and security in order to guarantee a certain
level of ETC. For example, in Figure 3.4b, "t has to increase from 0:04 to 0:085 as
"s decreases from 0:03 to 0:02 for achieving an eavesdropper-tolerance capacity of
about1000. This suggests that either the security or reliability requirement has to
sacrice for the other one in order to achieve a certain ETC. Comparing the results
in Figure 3.4a and Figure 3.4b, we can see that the opportunistic relaying scheme
can achieve a much better ETC performance, which is orders of magnitude more
than that ensured by the random relaying scheme, even we consider a much worse
decoding ability for the receivers in the scenario with opportunistic relaying scheme.
For example, the ETC of random relaying scheme is about 10, while the ETC of
opportunistic relaying is about 8000 for "t = 0:1 and "s = 0:1.
To explore how the number of relays n, the minimum required SIR  and e aect
the eavesdropper-tolerance capability, we show the behaviors of ETC vs. n for both
relaying schemes in Figure 3.5. We set "t = 0:1 and "s = 0:1 for the random relaying
scheme and consider three dierent settings of  and e, i.e., ( = 0:6, e = 0:5),
( = 0:7, e = 0:5) and ( = 0:7, e = 0:6). The corresponding results are summarized
in Figure 3.5a. For the scenario of opportunistic relaying scheme, we set "t = 0:01 and
"s = 0:01 and also consider three dierent settings of  and e, i.e., ( = 10, e = 0:5),
( = 11, e = 0:5) and ( = 11, e = 0:5). It can be observed from Figure 3.5 that
both Mran and Mopp increase as n increases. This is because that although the
optimal noise-generating threshold threshold  decreases as n increase for a specic
reliability constraint "t, the corresponding expected number of noise-generating nodes
increases, so more interferences can be generated to suppress the eavesdroppers while
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Figure 3.5: ETC vs. number of relays n.
the desired reliability can still be ensured. By comparing the three curves in both
gures, we can also observe that the ETC of both relaying schemes increases as
e increases, while decreases as  increases. This is intuitive since decreasing the
decoding ability (i.e., increasing e) of the eavesdroppers would decrease the SOP,
while decreasing the decoding ability (i.e., increasing ) of legitimate receivers would
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increase the TOP. It is interesting to notice that both Mran and Mopp increases
dramatically when n is above some threshold in Figure 3.5a and 3.5b. For example,
for the case of  = 11 and e = 0:6 in Figure 3.5b, this threshold is about 2500. Thus,
distributing more relays would be an eective approach to enhance the eavesdropper-
tolerance capability of a network.
By comparing Figure 3.5a and Figure 3.5b, we can still see that the ETC of op-
portunistic relaying is much larger than that of the random relaying scheme, even we
consider more stringent security and reliability constraints and much worse decoding
ability for the opportunistic relaying scheme. For example, when the network has
n = 3000 relays, for the case of ( = 0:7, e = 0:6), the network can tolerate about
200 eavesdroppers (in Figure 3.5a) for the random relaying scheme, which is much
less than about 9000 eavesdroppers in the case of ( = 11, e = 0:6) in Figure 3.5b for
the opportunistic relaying scheme. This again proves that the opportunistic relaying
scheme signicantly outperforms the random relaying schemes in terms of the ETC
performance.
3.5 Summary
This chapter considered the secure and reliable transmission from the source to
the destination via cooperative jamming in two-hop relay wireless networks with
multiple passive and independently-operating eavesdroppers of unknown location and
channel information. Instead of scaling law results for innite networks and bounds
for nite networks, we determined the exact eavesdropper-tolerance capability to
ensure the desired security and reliability based on the metrics of secrecy outage
probability and transmission outage probability. We consider two relaying schemes,
i.e., the random relaying and opportunistic relaying. For both schemes, the results
in this paper indicate that the eavesdropper-tolerance capability of the network can
be increased if we distribute more relays or relax either the requirement of reliability
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or the requirement of security. More importantly, we observe that the opportunistic
relaying scheme can achieve a much better ETC performance, which is usually orders
of magnitude more than that ensured by the random relaying scheme.
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CHAPTER IV
Physical Layer Security Performance Study of
Small-Scale Wireless Networks with Colluding
Eavesdroppers
This chapter focuses on the PHY security performance study of small-scale wireless
networks with colluding eavesdroppers, for which we investigate the SOP performance
of a two-hop relay wireless networks under eavesdropper collusion. We consider two
eavesdropper scenarios to depict the behavior of eavesdroppers, i.e., non-colluding sce-
nario where eavesdroppers do not collude and operate independently and M-colluding
scenario where M eavesdroppers can collude to exchange and combine the received
signals so as to improve the successful decoding probability. We rst derive the ana-
lytical expression for the SOP under the non-colluding scenario, we then derive the
SOP under the M-colluding scenario by applying the techniques of Laplace transform,
keyhole contour integral and Cauchy Integral Theorem. Finally, simulation and nu-
merical results are provided to demonstrate the validity of the theoretical analysis
also to illustrate our theoretical ndings.
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4.1 System Model and Problem Formulation
4.1.1 Network Model
We consider a two-hop wireless network (depicted in Figure 4.1), consisting of a
source node S, a destination nodeD, n legitimate relays R1; R2;    ; Rn andm passive
eavesdroppers E1; E2;    ; Em of unknown channel information. Each node employs
a single antenna and operates in half-duplex mode. The direct link between S and D
is assumed unavailable due to deep fading or limited transmit power. The n relays
assist in forwarding the message from S to D while preventing the eavesdroppers from
intercepting the message. We assume that time is slotted and all channels, suering
from Rayleigh fading, remain constant during one time slot and vary randomly and
independently from slot to slot. The channel coecient hi;j of link i! j is modeled
as a complex zero-mean Gaussian random variable with unit variance and thus jhi;jj2
is exponentially distributed with unit mean. All channel coecients (S  R, R D,
R R, S E, R E) are assumed i.i.d.. The network is assumed interference-limited
and thus the noise at each receiver is negligible.
To accomplish the secure two-hop transmission from S to D, we adopt the op-
portunistic relaying, cooperative jamming and transmission schemes as introduced in
Chapter III. A relay Rb with the largest minfjhS;Rij2; jhRi;Dj2g announces itself as
the message relay in a distributed manner before the transmission. We assume that
only one S  D transmission, including the relay selection, can be conducted in one
time slot. In the rst hop, S transmits its message to Rb, while relays with indices in
J1 =

i
i 6= b; jhRi;Rbj2 < 	 serve as helper jammers to generate random Gaussian
noise. Here,  is the noise-generating threshold to mitigate interference at intended
receivers. We assume a common transmit power Pt for all transmitters. Hence, the
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Figure 4.1: Network model: A source S is communicating with a destination D with
the help of relays R1; R2;    ; Rn; n = 6. R4 is selected as the message relay based on
the opportunistic relaying scheme. In Hop 1, R1; R5 and R6 are jammers that generate
articial noise, while R2 and R6 are jammers in Hop 2. E1; E2;    ; Em;m = 5
are eavesdroppers that try to intercept the message, and E1 and E2 are colluding
eavesdroppers.
received SIR at Rb and that at Ej can be given by
SIRS;Rb =
jhS;Rbj2P
i2J1 jhRi;Rbj2
; SIRS;Ej =
jhS;Ej j2P
i2J1 jhRi;Ej j2
: (4.1)
If Rb is successful in decoding the message received from S, it re-encodes the
message and then sends it to D in the second hop. Meanwhile, relays with indices in
J2 =

i
i 6= b; jhRi;Dj2 < 	 serve as helper jammers to generate articial noise. If Rb
fails to decode the message, the transmission will be suspended. We assume that Rb
will send back an ACK message to inform S whether a decoding failure happens or
not, based on which S will then decide whether to suspend the transmission or not.
If a transmission suspension happens during one time slot, it will end at the end of
that time slot, and retransmission of the suspended message will be conducted in the
next time slot. The received SIR at D and Ej can be given by
SIRRb;D =
jhRb;Dj2P
i2J2 jhRi;Dj2
; SIRRb;Ej =
jhRb;Ej j2P
i2J2 jhRi;Ej j2
: (4.2)
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A legitimate receiver (eavesdropper) is said successful in decoding the received signal
if its received SIR is above a minimum required SIR  (e).
4.1.2 Eavesdropper Scenarios
Regarding the eavesdropper behavior, we focus on the following two scenarios,
1. Non-Colluding case: each eavesdropper works independently and decodes
the message from the source solely based on its available observations, i.e., the
rst-hop observation if the transmission is suspended in the second hop or the
combined observations in both hops, otherwise.
2. M-Colluding case: any M eavesdroppers (say, E1; E2;    ; EM ; 1  M  m,
M = 2 as illustrated in Figure 4.1) can combine their available observations to
decode the message from the source.
Here, M is referred to as the collusion intensity to quantify the level of eavesdropper
collusion. As assumed in [37{48, 61], these colluding eavesdroppers can be treated as
a super eavesdropper with M antennas, whose SIR is given by the aggregate SIR of
all antennas.
4.1.3 Problem Formulation
We adopt the SOP metric as introduced in Chapter III to characterize the security
performance of the concerned network under eavesdropper collusion, which is dened
as the probability that the received SIR of at least one of the eavesdroppers is above
e. Therefore, by dening A as the event that the transmission is suspended in the
second hop, the SOP P ncso for the non-colluding case can be formulated as
P ncso = P
 
m[
j=1
fSIRS;Ej  eg; A
!
+ P
 
m[
j=1
fSIRS;Ej + SIRRb;Ej  eg; A
!
; (4.3)
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where A is the complement of event A. Similarly, the SOP P cso for the M-colluding
case can be formulated as
P cso= P
 (
SIRAagg  e or
m[
j=M+1
fSIRS;Ej  eg
)
; A
!
(4.4)
+P
 (
SIR
A
agg  e or
m[
j=M+1
fSIRS;Ej + SIRRb;Ej  eg
)
; A
!
; (4.5)
where
SIRAagg =
MX
j=1
SIRS;Ej
denotes the aggregate SIR of M colluding eavesdroppers under event A and
SIR
A
agg =
MX
j=1
SIRS;Ej + SIRRb;Ej
denotes that under event A.
4.2 Secrecy Outage performance under Non-Colluding Case
In this section, we derive the SOP of the non-colluding eavesdropper case, for
which we will rst establish the following lemma regarding the probability that the
transmission is suspended in the second hop, conditioned on the number of jammers
in the rst hop.
Lemma 7 Dene the number of jammers in Hop h (h = 1; 2) by Jh and the event
Jh = s by J
s
h. For a two-hop S  D transmission with the opportunistic relaying and
cooperative jamming schemes, the probability pAjJs1 that the transmission is suspended
in the second hop under the condition Js1 can be determined as
pAjJs1 =
nX
k=0

n
k

( 1)k
2k   1

k

1  e (1+)
(1  e  )(1 + )
s
+ (k   1)

1  e (2k+1)
(1  e  )(2k + 1)
s
;
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where n is the number of relays,  is the noise-generating threshold in cooperative
jamming and  is the minimum required SIR for legitimate receivers to correctly
decode the source message.
Proof 9 Please refer to Appendix B.1.
Based on Lemma 7, the SOP of the non-colluding case can be obtained by applying
the law of total probability, which is given by the following theorem.
Theorem IV.1 Consider a two-hop wireless network as shown in Figure 4.1. For
the S   D transmission under the opportunistic relaying, cooperative jamming and
non-colluding eavesdropper case, the corresponding SOP P ncso can be formulated as
P ncso = 1 
n 1X
s=0
n 1X
t=0

n  1
s

n  1
t

(1  e  )s+te (2n 2 s t) (1  pAjJs1 )pm2 + pAjJs1pm1  ;
where n is the number of relays,  is the noise-generating threshold in cooperative
jamming, p1 = 1  

1
1+e
s
, p2 =
R e
0
h
1  1
(1+e x)t
i
s
(1+x)s+1
dx and pAjJs1 is given in
Lemma 7.
Proof 10 We start the proof with the rst term in (4.3). By the law of total proba-
bility, we have
P
 
m[
j=1
fSIRS;Ej  eg; A
!
(4.6)
=
n 1X
s=0
P
 
m[
j=1
fSIRS;Ej  eg; A
Js1
!
P(Js1)
=
n 1X
s=0
P
 
m[
j=1
fSIRS;Ej  eg
Js1
!
pAjJs1P(J
s
1)
=
n 1X
s=0
"
1  P
 
m\
j=1
fSIRS;Ej < eg
Js1
!#
pAjJs1P(J
s
1)
=
n 1X
s=0

1  P  SIRS;Ej < ejJs1m pAjJs1P(Js1):
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Next, we consider the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of SIRS;Ej under the
condition Js1 , which can be given by
FS;Ej (xjJs1) = P

SIRS;Ej < x
Js1
= P
 
jhS;Ej j2 < x
X
i2J1
jhRi;Ej j2
Js1
!
= 1  EfjhRi;Ej j2;i2J1g
h
e x
P
i2J1 jhRi;Ej j
2
Js1i
= 1 
Y
i2J1
EjhRi;Ej j2
h
e xjhRi;Ej j
2
i
= 1 

1
1 + x
s
:
From the above cdf, it is easy to see that
P
 
SIRS;Ej < ejJs1

= 1 

1
1 + e
s
= p1: (4.7)
As J1 is a binomial random variable, it follows that
P(Js1) =

n  1
s

(1  e  )se (n 1 s) : (4.8)
Hence, substituting (4.7) and (4.8) into (4.6) yields
P
 
m[
j=1
fSIRS;Ej  eg; A
!
=
n 1X
s=0

n 1
s

(1 e  )se (n 1 s) (1 pm1 )pAjJs1 : (4.9)
We now consider the second term in (4.3). Likewise, taking the expectation of
(4.3) in terms of J1 and J2 yields
P
 
m[
j=1
fSIRS;Ej + SIRRb;Ej  eg; A
!
(4.10)
=
n 1X
s=0
n 1X
t=0

1  P  SIRS;Ej + SIRRb;Ej < ejJs1 ; J t2mP( AjJs1)P(Js1)P(J t2):
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It is straightforward to see that P( AjJs1) = 1 pAjJs1 ; and P(J t2) =
 
n 1
t

(1 e  )te (n 1 t) .
Similar to (4.7), the cdf of SIRRb;Ej under the condition J
t
2 can be given by FSIRRb;Ej (xjJ t2) =
1  ( 1
1+x
)t. From (4.7), the pdf of SIRS;Ej under the condition J
s
1 is fSIRS;Ej (xjJs1) =
s
(1+x)s+1
. Hence,
P
 
SIRS;Ej + SIRRb;Ej < ejJs1 ; J t2

=
Z e
0

1  1
(1 + e   x)t

s
(1 + x)s+1
dx = p2: (4.11)
Substituting (4.8), (4.11), P( AjJs1) and P(J t2) into (4.10) yields
P
 
m[
j=1
fSIRS;Ej + SIRRb;Ej  eg; A
!
(4.12)
=
n 1X
s=0
n 1X
t=0

n  1
s

n  1
t

(1  e  )s+te (2n 2 s t) (1  pm2 )(1  pAjJs1 ):
Finally, the theorem follows after summing (4.9) and (4.12).
4.3 Secrecy Outage Performance under M-Colluding Case
In this section, the SOP of the M-colluding case is investigated, for which we
will rst derive the cdf of the aggregate SIR SIRAagg and SIR
A
agg of any M colluding
eavesdroppers, based on which we then determine the SOP.
4.3.1 Aggregate SIR Analysis
Notice that the aggregate SIR SIRAagg and SIR
A
agg are the sums of multiple i.i.d.
random variables. The derivation of their cdf usually involves a multi-fold convolution,
which is highly cumbersome in general. To work around this problem, we rst take
the Laplace transforms of their pdf and then compute the related inverse Laplace
transform by applying the keyhole contour integral and Cauchy Integral Theorem.
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Finally, the cdf can be obtained from the corresponding pdf. The related lemma and
proof are summarized as follows.
Lemma 8 Dene the cdf of SIRAagg under event A by FM(x) and that of SIR
A
agg
under event A by F2M(x). For a two-hop S D transmission under the opportunistic
relaying, cooperative jamming and M-colluding eavesdropper case, FM(x) under the
conditions Js1 and J
t
2 can be given by
FM(x) = s
M
bM 1
2
cX
k=0

M
2k + 1

( 2)k (4.13)

Z 1
0
1
u
(1  e xu)e MuEIs(u)M 2k 1

us
s!
2k+1
du
and F2M(x) under the conditions J
s
1 and J
t
2 can be given by
F2M(x) = (st)
M
bM 1
2
cX
k=0

M
2k + 1

( 2)k (4.14)

Z 1
0
1
u
(1  e xu)e 2Mu

EIs(u)EIt(u)  2u
s+t
s!t!
M 2k 1


EIs(u)
ut
t!
+ EIt(u)
us
s!
2k+1
du
where
EIs(u) =
us
s!
 
sX
k=1
1
k
  cE   lnu
!
 
1X
k=0;k 6=s
uk
(k   s)k! (4.15)
and cE = 0:5772156649::: is the Euler's constant.
Proof 11 Dene fM(x) the pdf of SIR
A
agg and LfM (z) its Laplace transform. Based
on the pdf fSIRS;Ej (x) =
s
(1+x)s+1
of SIRS;Ej under the condition J
s
1 , LfM (z) can be
determined as LfM (z) = (sezEs+1(z))M by the convolution property of Laplace trans-
form, where Es+1(z) =
R1
1
e zv
vs+1
dv is the generalized exponential integral.
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Figure 4.2: Illustration of the keyhole contour, where C1 is a vertical line from c  iR
to c+ iR, C2 and C6 forms a large (almost) semi-circle centered at s = c with radius
R, C3 is a line from c  R to  r, C4 is a small (almost) circle centered at the origin
with radius r, C5 is a line from  r to c R.
Next, fM(x) can be obtained by taking the inverse Laplace transform of LfM (z) ,
that is, fM(x) =
1
2i
R c+i1
c i1 e
zxLfM (z)dz, where c > 0 is an arbitrary constant greater
than the real part of all singularities of LfM (z). Since Es+1(z) is analytical in the
complex plane except its branch cut along the negative real axis and branch point at
the origin, the above integral can be evaluated as a part of the integral along a keyhole
contour 
 [62], as illustrated in Figure 4.2. As LfM (z) is analytical in 
, by the
Cauchy Integral Theorem, we have
R


ezxLfM (z)dz = 0. Hence,
fM(x) =
1
2i
lim
R!1
Z
C1
ezxLfM (z)dz (4.16)
=   1
2i
lim
R!1;r!0
Z
C2
+
Z
C3
+
Z
C4
+
Z
C5
+
Z
C6
ezxLfM (z)dz
=   1
2i
lim
R!1;r!0
Z
C3
+
Z
C5
ezxLfM (z)dz:
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To see this, we need to prove that the integrals along C2, C4 and C6 vanish in the
limit. First, letting z = c+Rei;  2 [=2; ] for any point z on C2 yields
lim
R!1
Z
C2
ezxLfM (z)dz
 = limR!1

Z 

2
ex(c+Re
i)LfM (c+Rei)iReid

 lim
R!1
Z 

2
ex(c+Rei) LfM (c+Rei) iRei d
 lim
R!1
max
2[=2;]
LfM (c+Rei)Rexc Z 

2
exR cos d
= lim
R!1
max
2[=2;]
LfM (c+Rei)Rexc Z 2
0
e xR sind:
Since sin  2

for any  2 [0; 
2
], then we have
Z 
2
0
e xR sind 
Z 
2
0
e 2xR=d =

2xR
(1  e xR)  
2xR
;
and thus
lim
R!1
Z
C2
ezxLfM (z)dz
  limR!1 exc2x max2[=2;] LfM (c+Rei) :
From Equation (5.1.51) in [63], we know
ezEs+1(z)  1
z
  s+ 1
z2
+
(s+ 1)(s+ 2)
z3
+    ;
hence
jec+ReiEs+1(c+Rei)j = O(1=R)
and then
max
2[=2;]
LfM (c+Rei) = O(1=RM);
as R!1. Therefore, limR!1
RC2 ezxLfM (z)dz = 0. Likewise, it can be easily seen
that the integral along C6 vanishes as R tends to innity and that along C4 vanishes
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as r tends to zero.
Now, we proceed to evaluate the integrals along C3 and C5. By letting z = ue
i
for the integral along C3 and z = ue
 i for that along C5, we have
fM(x) =   1
2i
lim
R!1;r!0
Z
C3
+
Z
C5
ezxLfM (z)dz (4.17)
=   1
2i
lim
R!1;r!0
Z  r
c R
+
Z c R
 r
ezxLfM (z)dz
=
1
2i
Z 1
0
e xu
 LfM (ue i)  LfM (uei) du
=
sM
2i
Z 1
0
e (x+M)u

Es+1(ue
 i)M   Es+1(uei)M

du:
From Equation (5.1.12) in [63], we have Es+1(ue
i) = EIs(u)i uss! , where EIs(u) =
us
s!
 Ps
k=1
1
k
  cE   lnu
  P1k=0;k 6=s uk(k s)k! and cE = 0:5772156649::: is the Euler's
constant. Hence,
Es+1(ue
 i)M   Es+1(uei)M (4.18)
=

EIs(u) + i
us
s!
M
 

EIs(u)  iu
s
s!
M
= 2i
bM 1
2
cX
k=0

M
2k + 1

( 2)kEIs(u)M 2k 1

us
s!
2k+1
:
Substituting (4.18) into (4.17) yields
fM(x) =
Z 1
0
e (x+M)u(M; s; u)du;
where
(M; s; u) = sM
bM 1
2
cX
k=0

M
2k + 1

( 2)kEIs(u)M 2k 1

us
s!
2k+1
:
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The cdf FM(x) of SIR
A
agg can be determined via the integration of fM(x) as
FM(x) =
Z 1
0
1
u
(1  e xu)e Mu(M; s; u)du:
Finally, taking the integral for each summand involving u in (M; s; u) rst and then
summing the integrals yields (4.13).
We now consider the cdf F2M(x) of SIR
A
agg. Similarly, we dene f2M(x) the pdf
of SIR
A
agg and Lf2M (z) its Laplace transform. Again, by the convolution property of
Laplace transform, we have Lf2M (z) = (ste2zEs+1(z)Et+1(z))M under the conditions
Js1 and J
t
2. Taking the inverse Laplace transform of Lf2M (s) along again the keyhole
contour in Figure 4.2 yields
f2M(x) (4.19)
=
(st)M
2i
Z 1
0
e (x+2M)u

(Es+1(ue
 i)Et+1(ue i))M   (Es+1(uei)Et+1(uei))M

du
=
Z 1
0
e (x+2M)u(M; s; t; u)du;
where
(M; s; t; u) = (st)M
bM 1
2
cX
k=0

M
2k + 1

( 2)k (4.20)


EIs(u)
ut
t!
+ EIt(u)
us
s!
2k+1 
EIs(u)EIt(u)  2u
s+t
s!t!
M 2k 1
:
The cdf F2M(x) of SIR
A
agg is determined as
F2M(x) =
Z 1
0
1
u
(1  e xu)e 2Mu(M; s; t; u)du: (4.21)
Likewise, taking the integral for each summand in (M; s; t; u) rst and then summing
the integrals yields (4.14).
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4.3.2 SOP Modeling
Based on Lemma 8, the SOP of M-colluding case is given by the following theorem.
Theorem IV.2 Consider a two-hop wireless network as shown in Figure 4.1. For
the S   D transmission under the opportunistic relaying, cooperative jamming and
M-colluding eavesdropper case as described in Section 4.1, the corresponding SOP P cso
can be formulated as
P cso = 1 
n 1X
s=0
n 1X
t=0

n  1
s

n  1
t

(1  e  )s+te (2n 2 s t) (4.22)

h
(1  pAjJs1 )pm M2 F2M(e) + pAjJs1pm M1 FM(e)
i
; (4.23)
where m is the number of eavesdroppers, M denotes the collusion intensity, n is the
number of relays,  is the noise-generating threshold in cooperative jamming, e is
the minimum required SIR for eavesdroppers to correctly decode the source message,
p1 = 1 

1
1+e
s
, p2 =
R e
0
h
1  1
(1+e x)t
i
s
(1+x)s+1
dx, pAjJs1 is given in Lemma 7, and
FM(e) and F2M(e) can be directly obtained from Lemma 8.
Proof 12 Similar to the proof of Theorem IV.1, the rst term in (4.4) can be deter-
mined by taking its expectation in terms of J1 as
P
 (
SIRAagg  e or
m[
j=M+1
fSIRS;Ej  eg
)
; A
!
(4.24)
= EJ1
"
P
 (
SIRAagg  e or
m[
j=M+1
fSIRS;Ej  eg
)
; A
Js1
!#
=
n 1X
s=0
"
1  P
 
SIRAagg < e
Js1
!
P

SIRS;Ej < e
Js1m M
#
pAjJs1P(J
s
1)
=
n 1X
s=0

n  1
s

(1  e  )se (n 1 s)
h
1  pm M1 FM(e)
i
pAjJs1 :
The second term in (4.4) can be determined by taking its expectation in terms of J1
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and J2 as
P
 (
SIR
A
agg  e or
m[
j=M+1
fSIRS;Ej + SIRRb;Ej  eg
)
; A
!
(4.25)
=
n 1X
s=0
n 1X
t=0
P( AjJs1)P(Js1)P(J t2)

"
1  P
 
SIR
A
agg < e
Js1 ; J t2
!
P
 
SIRS;Ej + SIRRb;Ej < ejJs1 ; J t2
m M #
=
n 1X
s=0
n 1X
t=0

n 1
s

n 1
t

(1 e  )s+te (2n 2 s t) (1 pAjJs1 )
h
1 pm M2 F2M(e)
i
:
Finally, summing (4.24) and (4.25), the theorem then follows.
4.4 Numerical Results and Discussions
In this section, we rst validate our theoretical analysis for SOP modeling through
extensive simulations and then explore how the number of relays n, noise-generating
threshold  , SIR thresholds e and , and the collusion intensity M aect the secrecy
outage performance of the network.
4.4.1 Model Validation
A simulator was developed in C++ to simulate the S D transmission under the
system model as described in Section 4.1, which is now available at [64]. The total
number of S   D transmissions is xed as 100000 and the SOP is measured as the
ratio of the number of transmissions suering from secrecy outage to the total number
of transmissions. To verify our theoretical analysis, we conduct extensive simulations
for both the non-colluding case and the colluding case under various settings of n and
M . The number of eavesdroppers is set as m = 10, the noise-generating threshold is
set as  = 0:5, the transmit power is set as Pt = 100, and the decoding thresholds for
eavesdroppers and legitimate receivers are set as e = 0:5 and  = 1:0, respectively.
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Figure 4.3: Model validation for dierent collusion intensityM , withm = 10 ,  = 0:5,
e = 0:5 and  = 1:0.
Simulations with other settings can be easily conducted by our simulator as well. The
simulation results and the related theoretical ones are summarized in Figure 4.3.
It can be observed from Figure 4.3 that the simulation results match fairly well
with the theoretical ones for both the non-colluding case and the colluding case with
60
dierent collusion intensity M , which implies that our theoretical analysis is eective
in modeling the secrecy outage performance of the concerned system. A careful obser-
vation in Figure 4.3 reveals that the curve M = 1 of the colluding case coincides with
that of the non-colluding case, which is intuitive and further proves the eectiveness
of our theoretical analysis.
4.4.2 Performance Evaluation
Regarding the impact of the number of relays n on the secrecy outage performance,
it can be observed from Figure 4.3 that the SOP decreases as n increases for both
the non-colluding case and the colluding case with dierent collusion intensity M .
This is mainly due to the reason that, in the cooperative jamming scheme, more
interference will be generated at the eavesdroppers for a larger number of relays,
and thus the probability that eavesdroppers successfully decode the source message
would decrease. This suggests that distributing more relays is an eective approach
to decreasing the possibility of secrecy outage, and thus improving the security of the
concerned network. A careful observation from Figure 4.3 indicates that to degrade
the SOP to 50%, at least 20 relay nodes are required for M = 1 and at least 30 nodes
are required for M = 5. This is because that the articial noises generated from the
jammers not only degrade the eavesdropper channels but also degrade those of the
legitimate transmitter-receiver pairs at the same time.
To understand the impact of eavesdropper collusion M on the secrecy outage
performance, we summarize in Figure 4.4 how the SOP varies with M for three
dierent e (i.e., e = 0:3, e = 0:5 and e = 1:0), when n = 30, m = 10,  = 0:5
and  = 1:0. We can see from Figure 4.4 that as the collusion intensity M increases,
so does the SOP, implying that the eavesdropper collusion will signicantly increase
the possibility of secrecy outage, i.e., deteriorate the security performance of the
concerned network. For example, the SOP for e = 1:0 when all the eavesdroppers
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collude (i.e., M = m = 10) is 0:61825, which is much greater than the one 0:03346
when no eavesdroppers collude (i.e., M = 1). Another observation from Figure 4.4
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Figure 4.6: Relationship between theoretical results and representative network cases.
reveals that the SOP increases as the SIR threshold e for eavesdroppers decreases,
which is very intuitive since a smaller e results in a greater decoding ability for
eavesdroppers.
To see how the noise-generating threshold  aect the secrecy outage performance,
we summarize in Figure 4.5 how the SOP varies with  for dierent collusion intensity
M , when n = 30, m = 10, e = 0:5 and  = 1:0. The results in Figure 4.5 indicate
that the SOP decreases as the noise-generating threshold  increases for both the
non-colluding (M = 1) and colluding cases (M > 1), which is also because that more
interference will be generated at the eavesdroppers for a greater  . This indicates
that increasing the noise-generating threshold is also an eective way to enhance the
security performance of the concerned network.
To illustrate the relationships between the theoretical SOP results and network
cases, we provide the SOP results for six representative networks cases in Figure 4.6
for n = 30, m = 10, e = 0:5 and  = 1:0. We consider three dierent cases of
collusion intensity (i.e., M = 1, M = 5 and M = 10), which correspond to the
cases of no colluding, half colluding and full colluding respectively. For the jamming
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strength, we consider two cases of noise-generating threshold (i.e.,  = 0:05 and
 = 1:0), which correspond to the cases of weak jamming and strong jamming. We
can see from Figure 4.6 that the SOP increases as the collusion intensity increases,
while the SOP decreases as the jamming strength increases.
To further investigate the impact of the SIR threshold for legitimate receivers  on
the secrecy outage performance, we summarize in Figure 4.7 how the SOP varies with
 for dierent collusion intensity M , when n = 30, m = 10, e = 0:5 and  = 0:5.
It can be observed from Figure 4.7 that as  increases the SOP rst remain constant
and then decreases. This is mainly due to the reason that there exists some threshold
(e.g., about 0:2 in Figure 4.7) on . The transmission is conducted in two hops almost
surely for  less than this threshold, whereas the probability that the transmission is
suspended in the second hop increases as  increases beyond the threshold. Therefore,
the eavesdroppers can overhear the source message in two hops at the beginning but
then only in the rst hop with an increasing probability as  increases.
To illustrate the inherent tradeo between the number of relays n and the noise-
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generating threshold  , we summarized in Figure 4.8 the feasible (n; ) pairs to achieve
a target SOP, under the setting of m = 5, M = 2, e = 0:5 and  = 1:0. It can be
observed from Figure 4.8 that the noise-generating threshold  decreases with the
number of relays n. This means that if more relays nodes are distributed in the
network, a smaller noise-generating threshold is enough to achieve the same target
SOP. A careful observation from Figure 4.8 indicates that as the number of relays n
increases, the SOP is more sensitive to the change of noise-generating threshold  .
For example, to decrease the SOP from 0:5 to 0:2, an increase of  from 1:2 to 3:2
is required for n = 10, whereas a much smaller increase of  (i.e., the increase from
0:378 to 0:515) is enough for n = 30.
4.5 Summary
This chapter conducted theoretical analysis to explore the secrecy outage perfor-
mance of a two-hop wireless network under eavesdropper collusion, where coopera-
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tive jamming is adopted to counteract such attack. Two eavesdropper cases were
considered, i.e., the non-colluding case where eavesdroppers operate independently
and the M-colluding case where any M eavesdroppers combine their observations to
conduct eavesdropping attacks. We rst derived the SOP of non-colluding case and
then determined the SOP for M-colluding case by jointly applying the Laplace and
inverse Laplace transform, the keyhole contour integral and the Cauchy Integral The-
orem. Our results indicate that eavesdropper collusion can signicantly increase the
possibility of secrecy outage, and thus, deteriorate the security performance of the
concerned network. Another important nding of this paper is that the cooperative
jamming scheme can improve the network security by either distributing more relays
or increasing the noise-generating threshold.
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CHAPTER V
Cooperative Jamming Design in Large-Scale
Wireless Networks
In this chapter, we focus on the cooperative jamming design in large-scale wireless
networks, for which we propose a friendship-based cooperative jamming scheme to en-
sure the security of a nite Poisson Network with one source-destination pair, multiple
legitimate nodes and multiple eavesdroppers distributed according to two indepen-
dent and homogeneous Poisson Point Processes (PPP), respectively. To evaluate the
performances of the proposed jamming scheme, we derive analytical expressions for
the SOP and TOP of the concerned network under two typical cases of the path-
loss exponent, by applying the tools from Stochastic Geometry. Extensive simulation
and numerical results are presented to validate our theoretical analysis as well as to
illustrate the performances of the proposed cooperative jamming scheme.
5.1 Preliminaries and Jamming Scheme
5.1.1 System Model
As illustrated in Figure 5.1, we consider a nite wireless network with nodes dis-
tributed over a bi-dimensional disk B(o;D)  R2 with radius D. The network consists
of a source S located at the origin o and a destination D at location y0 with xed
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Figure 5.1: System model: nodes are distributed over a bi-dimensional disk B(o;D)
with radius D. The source S is located at the origin o and the destination D is located
at y0 with jjy0jj = l. Legitimate nodes and eavesdroppers are distributed according
to two independent homogeneous PPPs.
distance jjy0jj = l to the origin o. Also present in the network are multiple legitimate
nodes and multiple eavesdroppers, whose locations are modeled as two independent
and homogeneous PPPs  and E with intensities  and E, respectively. Through-
out this paper we will use x (z) to denote the random location of a legitimate node
(eavesdropper) as well as the node (eavesdropper) itself. To suppress the eavesdrop-
pers, a set of legitimate nodes will serve as jammers (i.e., J ) to generate random
Gaussian noise. The set of jammer locations is denoted as J .
We assume all channel suer from both small-scale Rayleigh fading and large-scale
log-distance path loss with exponent   2 [1]. The fading coecient is constant for
a block of transmission and varies randomly and independently from block to block
for all channels. We assume that the source and jammers transmit with the same
power Pt. Without loss of generality, we assume Pt = 1. The sum interference
caused by the set of jammers at any location y in the network is then given by I(y) =P
x2J jhx;yj2jjx yjj , where hx;y and jjx yjj are the fading coecient and distance
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between x and y, respectively. Due to the Rayleigh fading assumption, jhx;yj2 is
exponentially distributed and we assume unit mean for jhx;yj2, i.e., E[jhx;yj2] = 1. The
network is assumed interference-limited, and hence, the ambient noise is negligible.
The signal-to-interference ratio (SIR) for the destination D from the source S is then
given by SIRy0 =
jho;y0 j2l 
I(y0)
and the SIR for any eavesdropper z 2 E is given by
SIRz =
jho;z j2jjzjj 
I(z)
.
5.1.2 Friendship-based Cooperative Jamming
This paper adopts the cooperative jamming technique to ensure the transmission
security. Conventional cooperative jamming schemes usually do not exploit the inher-
ent social behaviors among networks and allow all nodes being jammers equally likely.
In practice, however, some nodes may refuse to serve as jammers, only because that
they have no social relationships with the transmitter. Based on this idea, this pa-
per proposes a friendship-based cooperative jamming scheme (as illustrated in Figure
5.2a) by exploiting the inherent friendship between the source and legitimate nodes.
Dierent from conventional cooperative jamming schemes, the proposed jamming
scheme aims to allow only the legitimate nodes that are friends of the source to serve
as jammers (see Figure 5.2 for the dierence). To model the friendship among net-
work nodes, we adopt the so-called octopus friendship model (see Figure 5.3 ) in [56],
where each node (say A) has not only local friends in a circle (called local friendship
circle) around itself but also N long-range friends randomly selected from the region
outside the local circle. Here, N can be drawn from any given discrete probability
distribution, such as power law, Poisson, geometric or uniform distribution.
Based on the octopus friendship model, the proposed cooperative jamming scheme
is composed of a Local Friendship Circle (LFC) with radius R1 and a Long-range
Friendship Annulus (LFA) with inner radius R1 and outer radius R2, where 0 <
R1  R2  D (illustrated in Figure 5.2a). Both the LFC and LFA are centered at
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(a) Conventional (b) Friendship-based
Figure 5.2: Friendship-based vs. conventional cooperative jamming.
Figure 5.3: Octopus friendship model.
the source (i.e., the origin o). We use A1 to denote the LFC and A2 to denote the
LFA. In the proposed jamming scheme, all legitimate nodes in A1 serve as jammers,
while each legitimate node x in A2 serves as a jammer through a location-based policy
P(jjxjj) 2 [0; 1]. Notice that dierent P(jjxjj) can yield dierent distributions of long-
range jammers (i.e., dierent J ). In this paper, we design three policies P(jjxjj),
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Figure 5.4: Illustration of long-range jammer selection policy.
which are summarized as follows.
 Policy E: In this policy, each node x 2  \ A2 is selected as a jammer with
Equal probability P (jjxjj) = p 2 [0; 1]. This policy corresponds to the scenario
where long-range jammers are uniformly distributed over A2 (see Figure 5.4).
 Policy I: In this policy, each node x 2  \ A2 is selected as a jammer with
probability P (jjxjj) Increasing with its path loss to the transmitter, i.e.,
P(jjxjj) = jjxjj
  R1
R2  R1
: (5.1)
This policy corresponds to the scenario where most of the long-range jammers
are distributed near the outer circle of the LFA (see Figure 5.4).
 Policy D: In this policy, each node x 2  \ A2, is selected as a jammer with
probability P (jjxjj) is Decreasing with its path loss to the transmitter, i.e.,
P(jjxjj) = R

2   jjxjj
R2  R1
: (5.2)
This policy corresponds to the scenario where most of the long-range jammers
are distributed near the inner circle of the LFA (see Figure 5.4).
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Remark 3 The policy P(jjxjj) can be interpreted as a thinning operation on  [65].
According to the property of thinning operation, the number of jammers in A2 still
follows a Poisson distribution. Hence, the friendship model in the proposed jamming
scheme is a special case of the one in [56], given that N is drawn from a Poisson
distribution.
5.1.3 Performance Metrics
The impact of friendship-based cooperative jamming scheme on the communi-
cation between the source S and destination y0 is two-edged. On one hand, the
interference generated by the jammers can degrade the eavesdropper channels, which
may greatly enhance the security of the communication. On the other hand, the
source-destination link is also impaired by the unintended interference, resulting in
a probably unreliable communication. To measure the reliability and security of the
source-destination communication, we still use the metrics of TOP and SOP as intro-
duced and dened in Chapter III. In this chapter, the TOP denotes the probability
that the SIR at the destination y0 is below some threshold , i.e., SIRy0 <  and
the SOP denotes the probability that the SIR at one or more eavesdroppers is above
some threshold e. Formally, the TOP is given by
Pto = P(SIRy0 < ); (5.3)
and the SOP is given by
Pso = P
 [
z2E
SIRy0 > e
!
: (5.4)
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5.2 Laplace Transform of Sum Interference
In this section, the Laplace transform of the sum interference I(y) at any location
y 2 B(o;D) is analyzed for all three long-range jammer selection policies. To make
the analysis mathematically tractable, we focus on two typical path loss scenarios of
 = 2 and  = 4.
According to the denition, the Laplace transform of I(y) is given by
L;I(y)(s) = EI(y)

e sI(y)

= EJ ;fjhx;y j2g
24exp
0@ s X
x2J
jhx;yj2jjx  yjj 
1A35
= EJ ;fjhx;y j2g
24 Y
x2J
exp
  sjhx;yj2jjx  yjj 
35
= EJ
24 Y
x2J
Ejhx;y j2

exp
  sjhx;yj2jjx  yjj 
35
= EJ
24 Y
x2J
1
1 + sjjx  yjj 
35 ; (5.5)
where  = E; I;D denotes the selection policy.
From the cooperative jamming scheme in Section 5.1.2, we can see that J is
indeed an inhomogeneous PPP obtained by applying two independent thinning op-
erations on . We now dene the intensity measure of J by (), which gives the
expected number of nodes in a given set. By applying the probability generating
functional of J , we have
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L;I(y)(s) = exp

 
Z
B(o;D)

1  1
1 + sjjx  yjj 

(dx)

= exp
8>>><>>>: 
Z
B(o;D)

s
s+ jjx  yjj

(dx)| {z }
A
9>>>=>>>; ; (5.6)
where (dx) is given by
(dx) =
8><>: dx; x 2 A1P(jjxjj)dx; x 2 A2 ; (5.7)
following from the thinning property of PPP. The term A in (5.6) can be rewritten
as
A = 
Z
A1

s
s+ jjx  yjj

dx| {z }
B
+
Z
A2

s
s+ jjx  yjj

P(jjxjj)dx| {z }
C
: (5.8)
Changing Cartesian coordinates to polar coordinates, we can rewrite B and C as
B = 2
Z R1
0
Z 
0
srddr
s+ (r2 + jjyjj2   2rjjyjj cos )=2 ; (5.9)
and
C = 2
Z R2
R1
Z 
0
srP(r)ddr
s+ (r2 + jjyjj2   2rjjyjj cos )=2 : (5.10)
5.2.1 The Case of  = 2
In this subsection, we derive the Laplace transform of I(y) for the case of  = 2.
The main results are summarized in the following theorem.
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Theorem V.1 For the case of  = 2, the Laplace transform of the sum interference
I(y) at any location y 2 B(o;D) under Policy E is given by
LE;2I(y)(s) = exp
(
  s

p arcsinh
s+R22   jjyjj2
2jjyjjps (5.11)
+(1  p) arcsinh s+R
2
1   jjyjj2
2jjyjjps   ln
p
s
jjyjj
)
;
where  denotes the intensity of legitimate nodes, R1 denotes the radius of LFC (i.e.,
inner radius of LFA), R2 denotes the outer radius of LFA, arcsinh t = ln(t+
p
t2 + 1)
denotes the inverse hyperbolic sine function. The Laplace transform of I(y) under
Policy I and Policy D is given by
L0;2I(y)(s) = exp
(
  s

	
0
2 (R2; s; jjyjj) 	
0
2 (R1; s; jjyjj)
+

arcsinh
s+R21   jjyjj2
2jjyjjps   ln
p
s
jjyjj
)
; (5.12)
where 0 = I and D,
	I2(r; s; jjyjj) =
p
(r4+2(s jjyjj2)r2+(s+jjyjj2)2
R22 R21
  s+R
2
1 jjyjj2
R22 R21
arcsinh
s+r2 jjyjj2
2jjyjjps ;
and
	D2 (r; s; jjyjj) =
s+R22 jjyjj2
R22 R21
arcsinh
s+r2 jjyjj2
2jjyjjps  
p
(r4+2(s jjyjj2)r2+(s+jjyjj2)2
R22 R21
:
Proof 13 The proof is given in Appendix C.2.
5.2.2 The Case of  = 4
The Laplace transform of I(y) for the case of  = 4 is derived in this subsection.
The main results are summarized in the following theorem.
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Theorem V.2 For the case of  = 4, the Laplace transform of the sum interference
I(y) at any location y 2 B(o;D) under Policy E is given by
LE;4I(y)(s) = exp
(
  ps


2
  (1  p) arctan
p
s+  (R1; s; jjyjj)
(R1; s; jjyjj) +R21   jjyjj2
 p arctan
p
s+  (R2; s; jjyjj)
(R2; s; jjyjj) +R22   jjyjj2
)
;
where  denotes the intensity of legitimate nodes, R1 denotes the radius of LFC (i.e.,
inner radius of LFA), R2 denotes the outer radius of LFA,
(r; s; jjyjj) =
qp
(g(r; s; jjyjj))2 + 4s(r2 + jjyjj2)2 + g(r; s; jjyjj)
p
2
;
g(r; s; jjyjj) = (r2   jjyjj2)2   s; (5.13)
 (r; s; jjyjj) =
p
s(r2 + jjyjj2)
(r; s; jjyjj) ; (5.14)
and arctan t is the inverse tangent function. The Laplace transform of I(y) under
Policy I and Policy D is given by
L0;4I(y)(s) = exp
(
  ps


2
  arctan
p
s+  (R1; s; jjyjj)
(R1; s; jjyjj) +R21   jjyjj2
+	
0
4 (R2; s; jjyjj) 	
0
4 (R1; s; jjyjj)
)
; (5.15)
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where 0 = I and D,
	I4(r; s; jjyjj) =
2
p
sjjyjj2
R42  R41
ln

((r; s; jjyjj) + r2   jjyjj2)2 + (ps+  (r; s; jjyjj))2

  1
2(R42  R41)

(r2 + 3jjyjj2) (r; s; jjyjj)  3ps(r; s; jjyjj)

+
s+R41   jjyjj4
R42  R41
arctan
p
s+  (r; s; jjyjj)
(r; s; jjyjj) + r2   jjyjj2 ; (5.16)
and
	D4 (r; s; jjyjj) =  
2
p
sjjyjj2
R42  R41
ln

((r; s; jjyjj) + r2   jjyjj2)2 + (ps+  (r; s; jjyjj))2

+
1
2(R42  R41)

(r2 + 3jjyjj2) (r; s; jjyjj)  3ps(r; s; jjyjj)

 s+R
4
2   jjyjj4
R42  R41
arctan
p
s+  (r; s; jjyjj)
(r; s; jjyjj) + r2   jjyjj2 : (5.17)
Proof 14 The proof is given in Appendix C.3.
Corollary 1 For P(r) = 0, as R1 !1, the Laplace transform of I(y) for the case of
 = 4 is L;4I(y)(s) = exp

 
p
s2
2

, which recovers the well-known Laplace transform
of I(y) for a homogeneous innite PPP with  = 4 [66].
Proof 15 Letting P(r) = 0 yields
L;4I(y)(s) = exp
(
  ps


2
  arctan
p
s+  (R1; s; jjyjj)
(R1; s; jjyjj) +R21   jjyjj2
)
:
As R1 !1,
lim
R1!1
arctan
p
s+  (R1; s; jjyjj)
(R1; s; jjyjj) +R21   jjyjj2
= arctan
2
p
s
1  jjyjj2 = 0; (5.18)
which completes the proof.
77
5.3 Outage Performance
In this section, the TOP and SOP of the proposed cooperative jamming scheme
are analyzed. We focus again on the cases of  = 2 and  = 4. The analysis is based
on the Laplace transforms of the sum interference I(y) derived in Section 5.2. We
rst determine the exact expression for the TOP and then obtain both the upper and
lower bounds on the SOP.
5.3.1 Transmission Outage Probability
The TOP can be regarded as a measure of the link reliability between the source S
and destination D. For the Rayleigh fading channel model, the TOP can be directly
derived by applying the Laplace transform of the sum interference at the location of
destination y0 [66]. The following theorem is established to summarize the result of
the TOP.
Theorem V.3 Consider a nite Poisson network with nodes distributed over a bi-
dimensional disk B(o;D) as illustrated in Figure 5.1 and the friendship-based coop-
erative jamming scheme in Section 5.1.2, the TOP of the source-destination pair is
given by
Pto= 1  L;I(y0)(l); (5.19)
where  = E, I and D denotes the long-range jammer selection policy,  denotes the
path loss exponent, and the Laplace transform L;I(y0)(l) of the sum interference at
the destination y0 is given by (5.11), (5.12), (5.13), (5.15) with jjy0jj = l, s = l for
the cases of  = 2 and  = 4, respectively.
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Proof 16 From the denition of TOP in (5.3), we have
Pto = P (SIRy0 < )
= P
 jho;y0 j2l 
I(y0)
< 

= EJ

P
 jho;y0 j2l 
I(y0)
< 
J
= EJ

P
 jho;y0 j2 < lI(y0)J 
= 1  EI(y0)

e l
I(y0)

= 1  L;I(y0)(l); (5.20)
which completes the proof.
5.3.2 Secrecy Outage Probability
The SOP is a commonly-used performance metric to quantify the PHY security. In
the performance analysis of large-scale systems, the exact SOP is usually unavailable,
mainly due to the reason that the analysis involves computing highly cumbersome
integrals in terms of the PPPs of both legitimate nodes and eavesdroppers. We
therefore resort to obtain the upper and lower bounds on the SOP by applying the
bounding technique used in [67]. We establish the following theorem to summarize
the main results.
Theorem V.4 Consider a nite Poisson network with nodes distributed over a bi-
dimensional disk B(o;D) as illustrated in Figure 5.1 and the friendship-based cooper-
ative jamming scheme in Section 5.1.2, the upper bound on the SOP of the source-
destination pair is given by
PUBso = 1  exp

 2E
Z D
0
L;I(z)(ere )redre

; (5.21)
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and the lower bound is given by
P LBso =
Z D
0
2Ereexp( Er2e)L;I(z)(ere)dre ; (5.22)
where E denotes the intensity of eavesdroppers, e denotes the minimum required
SIR for eavesdroppers to correctly decode the message,  = E, I and D denotes the
long-range jammer selection policy,  denotes the path loss exponent, z denotes the
eavesdropper nearest to the source o, re denotes the distance between z
 and o, and the
Laplace transform L;I(z)(re ) is given by (5.11), (5.12), (5.13), (5.15) with jjzjj = re,
s = re for the cases of  = 2 and  = 4, respectively.
Proof 17 From the denition of SOP in (5.3), we have
Pso = P
 [
z2E
SIRy0 > e
!
= 1  P
 \
z2E
SIRz < e
!
= 1  EJ
"
EE
"
P
 \
z2E
jho;zj2jjzjj 
I(z)
< e
E;J!##
(a)
= 1  EJ
"
EE
" Y
z2E
P
 jho;zj2jjzjj 
I(z)
< e
E;J##
= 1  EJ
"
EE
" Y
z2E

1  P
 jho;zj2jjzjj 
I(z)
> e
E;J##
(b)
= 1  EJ
"
exp
(
  E
Z
B(o;D)
P
 jho;zj2jjzjj 
I(z)
> e
J dz)#; (5.23)
where (a) follows since jho;zj2, z 2 E are i.i.d. random variables, and (b) follows from
applying the probability generating functional of E. Applying the Jensen's Inequality
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yields the upper bound on Pso, we have
Pso  1  exp
(
  E
Z
B(o;D)
EJ

P
 jho;zj2jjzjj 
I(z)
> e
J dz)
= 1  exp

 E
Z
B(o;D)
L;I(z)(ejjzjj)dz

= 1  exp

 2E
Z D
0
L;I(z)(ere )redre

: (5.24)
The lower bound is obtained by considering only the eavesdropper z nearest to
the source S. Let Rz denote the random distance between z
 and S. The probability
distribution function of Rz can be given by
fRz (re) =
8><>:2Ereexp( Er
2
e); 0  re  D
0; otherwise
:
Please refer to Appendix C.4 for the proof. The SOP can then be bounded from below
by the probability that z causes a secrecy outage, i.e.,
Pso  P(SIRz > e) (5.25)
=
Z D
0
P
 jho;z j2r e
I(z)
> e

fRz (re)drz
=
Z D
0
2Ereexp( Er2e)L;I(z)(ere)dre :
5.4 Numerical Results and Discussions
In this section, we rst conduct extensive simulations to verify the theoretical
analysis of TOP and SOP. We then explore how the parameters of the friendship-
based cooperative jamming scheme aect the TOP and SOP performances of the
legitimate transmission.
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5.4.1 Simulation Settings
A simulator based on C++ was developed to simulate the PPPs  and E, the
friendship-based cooperative jamming model and the transmission process between
the source S and destination D, which is now available at [68]. The PPP  (E)
is simulated by applying the method in [65], where the rst step is to generate a
Poisson-distributed number N with mean D2 (ED2 for E) and the second step
is to distribute N nodes uniformly over the network B(o;D). The total number of
source-destination transmissions is xed as 100000 and the common transmit power is
xed as 1. The TOP is calculated as the ratio of the number nto of transmissions with
transmission outage to the total transmission number, i.e., TOP = nto
100000
: Similarly,
The SOP is calculated as SOP = nso
100000
, where nso is the number of transmissions
with secrecy outage.
Extensive simulations have been conducted to verify the theoretical analysis of
TOP and SOP. We considered the cases of  = 2 and  = 4 and examined how the
TOP and SOP vary with the density of legitimate nodes  under three long-range
jammer selection policies E, I and D. For both path loss cases, the network radius
was xed as D = 30 and the density of eavesdroppers was xed as E = 0:001. For
the friendship-based cooperative jamming scheme, the radius of the LFC was xed as
R1 = 1, the outer radius of the LFA was xed asR2 = 10 and the selection probability
in Policy E was set as p = 0:1. The SIR thresholds were xed as  = 0:5 for the
destinationD and e = 0:1 for eavesdroppers. The source-destination distance was set
as l = 1. The corresponding simulation results and theoretical results are summarized
in Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6.
5.4.2 Model Validation
Figure 5.5a and Figure 5.6a indicate clearly that the simulation results of TOP
match nicely with the theoretical ones, so our theoretical results can be applied to
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Figure 5.5: Simulation results vs. theoretical results for TOP and SOP for  = 2.
model the TOP performance of the Poisson networks under Policy E, Policy I and
Policy D for the cases of  = 2 and  = 4. Figures 5.5b, 5.5c, 5.5d, 5.6b, 5.6c and
5.6d indicate that the simulation results of SOP are very close to the corresponding
theoretical upper bounds, while they are dierent from the lower bounds, so our
theoretical upper bounds can serve as accurate approximations for the exact SOP of
the legitimate transmission under Policy E, Policy I and Policy D for the cases of
 = 2 and  = 4. In the following, we mainly focus on the case of  = 4, as the
behaviors of TOP and SOP for  = 2 and  = 4 are similar. In addition, we use the
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Figure 5.6: Simulation results vs. theoretical results of TOP and SOP for  = 4.
theoretical upper bounds on SOP in the discussions of the SOP performance.
5.4.3 TOP and SOP vs. Jamming Parameters
We now explore how the TOP and SOP performances of the network vary with
the parameters of the friendship-based cooperative jamming scheme with dierent
long-range jammer selection policies. We rst examine the impact of the density of
legitimate nodes  on the TOP and SOP performances. It can be observed from
Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6 that the TOP increases as  increases, while the SOP de-
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creases as  increases under all policies E, I and D for both  = 2 and  = 4. This
is very intuitive since a larger sum interference can be generated in the network as
 increases, degrading both the source-destination channel and eavesdropper chan-
nels. As shown in Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6 in general, Policy I outperforms Policy
D in terms of the TOP performance, while Policy D can ensure a better SOP per-
formance than Policy I. This is due to the following two reasons. The rst one is
that Policy D has much more long-range jammers than Policy I, so it will generate
more interference in the network, resulting in a better SOP performance but a worse
TOP performance. The other reason is that the long-range jammers of Policy D are
much closer to the source than those of Policy I. Notice that near (i.e., close to the
source) eavesdroppers dominate the behavior of SOP, so Policy D is more eective
to suppress near eavesdroppers than Policy I, achieving a better SOP performance.
Notice that in Figure 5.5 and Figiure 5.6, the jammer selection probability of Pol-
icy E is xed as p = 0:1, which corresponds to a weak long-range jamming scenario.
For the moderate long-range jamming scenario (p = 0:5) and strong long-range jam-
ming scenario (p = 1:0), Figure 5.7 shows TOP and SOP vs.  for  = 4. As shown
in Figure 5.7 that the behaviors of TOP and SOP are similar for dierent p. One can
also observe from Figure 5.7 that the TOP increases as p increases, while the SOP
decreases as p increases. This indicates that we can exibly control the TOP and SOP
performances of Policy E by varying the long-range jammer selection probability p.
5.4.3.1 TOP and SOP vs. R1
We now investigate how the TOP and SOP performances are aected by the
radius of LFC R1, i.e., the inner radius of LFA. For the scenario of R2 = 10, D = 30,
 = 0:5,  = 0:1, l = 2 and  = 4, Figure 5.8a illustrates how the TOP varies with
R1 for Policy I, Policy D and Policy E with p = 0:5. We can see from Figure 5.8a
that the TOP rst increases as R1 increases, then saturates to a constant value and
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Figure 5.7: Impact of p on TOP and SOP for Policy E:
nally stays almost the same for Policy I and Policy E. Actually, this is also the
case for Policy D. The increasing behavior of TOP is because that the total number
of jammers increases as R1 increases, although the number of long-range jammers
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Figure 5.8: Impact of R1 on TOP and SOP.
decreases, which results in a larger sum interference in the network. The behavior
that TOP of all policies saturates to a same constant is due to the fact that all policies
nally reach to the same jamming pattern at the point of R1 = R2. For the scenario
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of R2 = 10, D = 30, e = 0:1, E = 0:001,  = 0:1 and  = 4, Figure 5.8b shows
how the SOP varies with R1 for Policy I, Policy D and Policy E with p = 0:5. It
can be observed from Figure 5.8b that the SOP rst decreases as R1 increases, then
saturates to a constant value and nally stays almost the same for all policies. This
is due to the same reason as explained above.
5.4.3.2 TOP and SOP vs. R2
Regarding the impact of the outer radius of LFA R2 on the TOP performance,
we show in Figure 5.9a how the TOP varies with R2 for Policy I, Policy D and
Policy E with p = 0:5 under the settings of R1 = 1, D = 30,  = 0:5,  = 0:1,
l = 2 and  = 4. As shown in Figure 5.9a that the TOP of Policy E and Policy D
always monotonically increases as R2 increases, but this is not the case for Policy I.
The increasing behavior of TOP for all policies are because that the number of long-
range jammers increases as R2 increases, generating a larger sum interference in the
network. The decreasing behavior of TOP for Policy I is due to that its long-range
jammers are getting further away from the destination as R2 continues to increase,
since these jammers are mainly located in a small annulus region near R2. For the
impact of R2 on the SOP performance, we illustrate in Figure 5.9b SOP vs. R2 for
Policy I, Policy D and Policy E with p = 0:5 under the settings of R1 = 1, D = 30,
e = 0:1, E = 0:001,  = 0:1 and  = 4. As expected, we can observe from Figure
5.9b that the SOP decreases as R2 increases for all policies.
5.5 Summary
This chapter explored the physical layer security-based secure communications
in a nite Poisson network with social friendships among nodes, for which a social
friendship-based cooperative jamming scheme is proposed. The jamming scheme con-
sists of a Local Friendship Circle (LFC) and a Long-range Friendship Annulus (LFA),
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Figure 5.9: Impact of R2 on TOP and SOP.
where all legitimate nodes in the LFC serve as jammers, but the legitimate nodes in
the LFA are selected as jammers through three location-based policies, namely, Policy
E, Policy I and Policy D. To understand the security and reliability performances of
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the proposed jamming scheme, we analyzed its TOP and SOP based on the Laplace
transforms of the sum interference at any location in the network. The results in this
paper indicated that, in general, Policy I outperforms Policy D in terms of the re-
liability performance, while Policy D can ensure a better security performance than
Policy I. Also, we can exibly control the reliability and security performances of
Policy E by varying its long-range jammer selection probability. An interesting ob-
servation from the results in this paper showed that increasing the outer radius of
the LFA beyond some threshold under Policy I can improve both the reliability and
security performances of the proposed jamming scheme.
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CHAPTER VI
Conclusion
In this thesis, we studied the PHY security performances of wireless networks,
where the PHY security technique of cooperative jamming is adopted to ensure secure
communications. We rst explored the PHY security performance of small-scale
wireless networks with non-colluding eavesdroppers, and then investigated the PHY
security performance of small-scale wireless networks with colluding eavesdroppers.
Finally, we examined the cooperative jamming design issue in large-scale wireless
networks.
For the PHY security performance of small-scale wireless networks with non-
colluding eavesdroppers, we studied in Chapter III the eavesdropper-tolerance capa-
bility (ETC) of a two-hop wireless network with one source-destination pair, multiple
relays and multiple on-colluding eavesdroppers. We rst theoretically analyzed the
secrecy outage probability (SOP) and transmission outage probability (TOP) of a two-
hop relay wireless network with cooperative jamming under two relaying schemes, i.e.,
random relaying and opportunistic relaying. Based on the SOP and TOP results, we
then determined the ETC of both schemes. The main results in Chapter III showed
that cooperative jamming is an eective technique to provide security for wireless
communications. In addition, we found that the opportunistic relaying scheme can
achieve a much better ETC performance, which is usually orders of magnitude more
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than that ensured by the random relaying scheme.
For the PHY security performance of small-scale wireless networks with colluding
eavesdroppers, we investigated in Chapter IV the SOP of a two-hop wireless network
with one source-destination pair, multiple relays and multiple colluding eavesdrop-
pers. We consider two eavesdropper scenarios to depict the behavior of eavesdroppers,
i.e., non-colluding scenario where eavesdroppers do not collude and operate indepen-
dently and M-colluding scenario where M eavesdroppers can collude to exchange and
combine the received signals so as to improve the successful decoding probability. We
rst derive the analytical expression for the SOP under the non-colluding scenario,
we then derive the SOP under the M-colluding scenario by applying the techniques
of Laplace transform, keyhole contour integral and Cauchy Integral Theorem. The
results in this chapter showed that eavesdropper collusion can signicantly increase
the possibility of secrecy outage, and thus, deteriorate the security performance of
the concerned network.
In Chapter V, we addressed the cooperative jamming design issue in large-scale
wireless networks, for which proposed a friendship-based cooperative jamming scheme
to ensure the secure transmission of a nite Poisson network with one source-destination
pair, multiple legitimate nodes and multiple eavesdroppers, whose locations are mod-
eled by two independent and homogeneous Poisson Point Processes, respectively. The
jamming scheme comprises an LFC and an LFA, where all legitimate nodes in the LFC
serve as jammers, and three location-based policies (i.e, Policy E, Policy I and Policy
D) are designed to select legitimate nodes in the LFA as jammers. The analytical ex-
pressions for the SOP and TOP were also derived to evaluate the performances of the
proposed scheme. The results in this paper indicated that, in general, Policy I out-
performs Policy D in terms of the reliability performance, while Policy D can ensure
a better security performance than Policy I. Also, we can exibly control the reliabil-
ity and security performances of Policy E by varying its long-range jammer selection
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probability. An interesting observation from the results in this paper demonstrated
that increasing the outer radius of the LFA beyond some threshold under Policy I
can improve both the reliability and security performances of the proposed jamming
scheme.
It is notable that, this thesis considers a relatively simple block Rayleigh fading
channel model where channel gains remain constant during a block of time. In prac-
tice, however, the channel may vary very fast even for a small time block. So, one of
the interesting and important future work is to study the PHY security performances
of wireless networks under more practice channel models.
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APPENDIX A
Proofs in Chapter III
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1 and 2
Proof of Lemma 1 : From the transmission protocol and the i.i.d fading as-
sumption, we can easily see that I1 and I2 are the sum of random variables which are
smaller than  among n 1 i.i.d random variables and thus I1 and I2 are independent
and identically distributed. Now we take I1 for example to determine the distribution
of the total interference in both hops. By using the function U(x) = 1x< (x) x in the
proof of Theorem III.1, we can rewrite I1 =
Pn
j=1;j 6=b U(jhRj ;Rbj2). The mean and vari-
ance of the mixed-type random variable U(jhRj ;Rbj2) can be given by 1 = 1 (1+)e 
and 21 = 1   2e    (1 + )2e 2 . Therefore, the pdf of I1 can be recursively given
by the following mixed density and mass function
f(x) =
8>>>><>>>>:
e (n 1) ; x = 0
pn 1(x)e x; 0 < x  (n  1)
0; otherwise;
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where pn 1(x) is a piecewise function and coincides with dierent polynomial functions
of degree at most n   2 on each interval (k; (k + 1) ] for 0  k  n   2. However,
it is quite dicult to determine the function pn 1(x), especially for large n. Thus,
we approximate I1 by a normal random variable with mean  = (n   1)1 and
variance 2 = (n   1)21, according to the Central Limit Theorem and its pdf can
be approximated by f(x)  f^(x) = e 
(x )2
22

p
2
where  = (n   1)
h
1   (1 + )e 
i
and
 =
r
(n  1)
h
1   2e    (1 + )2e 2
i
.
Proof of Lemma 2: Before deriving the probability in Lemma 2, we rst dene
the event that relay Rk; k = 1;    ; n is selected as the message relay by Ak (i.e.,
b = k). Besides, we use a new random variable Sj to dene minfjhS;Rj j2; jhRj ;Dj2g for
each relay Rj. It is notable that Sj; j = 1;    ; n is an exponential random variable
with mean 1
2
. Then, we have Ak

=
Tn
j=1;j 6=k (Sj  Sk).
Now, applying the law of total probability, we have
P

jhS;Rbj2  x; jhRb;Dj2  y

(A.1)
=
nX
k=1
P
 jhS;Rk j2  x; jhRk;Dj2  y; Ak
=
nX
k=1
P
 
jhS;Rk j2  x; jhRk;Dj2  y;
n\
j=1;j 6=k
(Sj  Sk)
!
=
nX
k=1
Z 1
0
P
 
jhS;Rk j2  x; jhRk;Dj2  y; Sk = s;
n\
j=1;j 6=k
(Sj  s)
!
ds
=
nX
k=1
Z 1
0
P

jhS;Rk j2  x; jhRk;Dj2  y; Sk = s

P
 
n\
j=1;j 6=k
(Sj  s)
!
ds
=
nX
k=1
Z 1
0
P

jhS;Rk j2  x; jhRk;Dj2  y; Sk = s

(1  e 2s)n 1ds;
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When x  y  0, (A.1) can be reduced to
P

jhS;Rbj2  x; jhRb;Dj2  y

(A.2)
=
nX
k=1
(Z 1
x
P

jhS;Rk j2 = s; jhRk;Dj2  s

(1  e 2s)n 1ds
+
Z x
y
P

jhS;Rk j2 > x; jhRk;Dj2 = s

(1  e 2s)n 1ds
+
Z 1
x
P

jhS;Rk j2 > s; jhRk;Dj2 = s

(1  e 2s)n 1ds
)
= 2n
Z 1
x
(1  e 2s)n 1
e2s
ds+ ne x
Z x
y
(1  e 2s)n 1
es
ds
= 1  (1  e 2x)n + ne x
Z e y
e x
(1  t2)n 1dt
= 1  (1  e 2x)n + ne x
h
'(n; y)  '(n; x)
i
;
where '(n; x) = e x2F1
 
1
2
; 1  n; 3
2
; e 2x

and 2F1 is the Gaussian hypergeometric
function. Similarly, when 0  x < y, (A.1) can be reduced to
P

jhS;Rbj2  x; jhRb;Dj2  y

= 1  (1  e 2y)n + ne y
h
'(n; x)  '(n; y)
i
Combining (A.2) and (A.3), Lemma 2 then follows.
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APPENDIX B
Proofs in Chapter IV
B.1 Proof of Lemma 7
It can be seen from the denition of event A that
pAjJ l1 = P
 
S;Rb < 
J l1 = P
 
jhS;Rbj2 < 
X
j2J1
jhRj ;Rbj2
J l1
!
:
Hence, we rst need to determine the distribution of jhS;Rbj2. DeneminfjhS;Rk j2; jhRk;Dj2g
for each relay Rk, k = 1;    ; n by Tk and the event that relay Rk announces itself as
the message relay by Bk (i.e., b = k). It is easy to see that Bk

=
Tn
j=1;j 6=k (Tj  Tk),
and all Tk's are i.i.d. and exponential random variables with mean 1=2. Thus, apply-
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ing the law of total probability, we have
P (jhS;Rbj2 < x) (B.1)
=
nX
k=1
P
 jhS;Rk j2 < x;Bk
=
nX
k=1
P
 
jhS;Rk j2 < x;
n\
j=1;j 6=k
(Tj  Tk)
!
=
nX
k=1
Z 1
0
P
 
jhS;Rk j2 < x;
n\
j=1;j 6=k
(Tj  t) ; Tk = t
!
dt
=
Z 1
0
nP
 jhS;Rk j2 < x; Tk = t (1  e 2t)n 1dt:
Again, by the law of total probability, we have
P
 jhS;Rk j2 < x; Tk = t (B.2)
=
8>>>><>>>>:
P (jhS;Rk j2 = t; jhRk;Dj2 > t)
+P (t < jhS;Rk j2 < x; jhRk;Dj2 = t) ; 0  t  x
0; otherwise
=
8><>:e
 t(2e t   e x); 0  t  x
0; otherwise:
Hence, after substituting (B.2) into (B.1) and conducting some algebraic manipula-
tion, we have
P (jhS;Rbj2 < x) =
nX
k=0

n
k

( 1)k ke
 x + (k   1)e 2kx
2k   1 : (B.3)
Next, the probability distribution of jhRj ;Rbj2 for any j 2 J1 can be given by
fjhRj;Rb j2(x) =
8><>:
e x
1 e  ; 0  x < 
0; x  
: (B.4)
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Hence, we have
pAjJ l1 = EfjhRj;Rb j2;j2J1g
"
nX
k=0

n
k

( 1)k 1
2k   1 (B.5)
ke 
P jhRj;Rb j2 + (k   1)e 2kP jhRj;Rb j2 J l1
#
=
nX
k=0

n
k

( 1)k 1
2k   1
 
kE
h
e 
P jhRj;Rb j2 jJ l1
i
+(k   1)E
h
e 2k
P jhRj;Rb j2 jJ l1
i!
=
nX
k=0

n
k

( 1)k 1
2k   1
"
k

1  e (1+)
(1  e  )(1 + )
l
+(k   1)

1  e (2k+1)
(1  e  )(2k + 1)
l #
:
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APPENDIX C
Proofs in Chapter V
C.1 Integral Identities
Identity 1 For a; b 2 R and a > jbj, we have from [69] and [70]
Z 
0
d
(a+ b cos )n+1
=
Pn(
ap
a2 b2 )
(a2   b2)n+12 ; (C.1)
where Pn() is the nth-Legendre polynomial and P0() = 1 .
Identity 2 Let a; b; c 2 R and c > 0. Dening Q = ct2 + bt + a and  = 4ac   b2,
we have from [69] and [70]
Z
dtp
Q
=
1p
c
ln(2
p
cQ+ 2ct+ b) [c > 0]
=
1p
c
arcsinh
2ct+ bp

[c > 0; > 0]; (C.2)
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Identity 3 For m;n 2 Z and Q = ct2 + bt+ a, we have from [69]
Z
tmp
Q2n+1
dt =
tm 1
(m  2n)cpQ2n 1   (2m  2n  1)b2(m  2n)c
Z
tm 1p
Q2n+1
dt
  (m  1)a
(m  2n)c
Z
tm 2p
Q2n+1
dt; (C.3)
where a; b; c 2 R and c > 0.
C.2 Proof of Theorem V.1
For  = 2, we can rewrite B as
B2 = 2
Z R1
0
Z 
0
srddr
s+ r2 + jjyjj2   2rjjyjj cos  : (C.4)
Applying Identity 1 in Appendix C.1, we have
B2 = s
Z R1
0
2rdrp
r4 + 2(s  jjyjj2)r2 + (s+ jjyjj2)2
t$r2
= s
Z R21
0
dtp
(t2 + 2(s  jjyjj2)t+ (s+ jjyjj2)2 ; (C.5)
We then apply Identity 2 in Appendix C.1 and substitute t with r2 to obtain
B2 = s

arcsinh
s+R21   jjyjj2
2jjyjjps   ln
p
s
jjyjj

: (C.6)
Similarly, applying Identity 1, we can rewrite C as
C2 = s
Z R2
R1
2rP (r)drp
r4 + 2(s  jjyjj2)r2 + (s+ jjyjj2)2 : (C.7)
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For Policy E, P (r) = p. Then, we have
C2 = ps arcsinh
s+ r2   jjyjj2
2jjyjjps
R2
r=R1
: (C.8)
Substituting (C.8) and (C.6) into (5.9) in Section 5.2, and then substituting (5.9) into
(5.8) yields the Laplace transform of I(y) under Policy E for  = 2.
Next, P (r) can be written as P (r) = u + vr2, where u =   R21
R22 R21 , v =
1
R22 R21 for
Policy I, and u =
R22
R22 R21 , v =  
1
R22 R21 for Policy D. Hence,
C2 = s
Z R2
R1
2r(u+ vr2)drp
r4 + 2(s  jjyjj2)r2 + (s+ jjyjj2)2
= s
Z R22
R21
(u+ vt)dtp
(t2 + 2(s  jjyjj2)t+ (s+ jjyjj2)2
= s

u
Z R22
R21
dtp
(t2 + 2(s  jjyjj2)t+ (s+ jjyjj2)2
+v
Z R22
R21
tdtp
(t2 + 2(s  jjyjj2)t+ (s+ jjyjj2)2

t$r2
= s

(u  vs+ vjjyjj2) arcsinh s+ t  jjyjj
2
2jjyjjps
+v
p
(t2 + 2(s  jjyjj2)t+ (s+ jjyjj2)2
R22
t=R21
; (C.9)
Substituting t with r2, we have
C2 = s

(u  vs+ vjjyjj2) arcsinh s+ r
2   jjyjj2
2jjyjjps (C.10)
+v
p
(r4 + 2(s  jjyjj2)r2 + (s+ jjyjj2)2
R2
r=R1
:
Finally, we substitute (C.6) and (C.10) into (5.9) in Section 5.2, and then substi-
tute (5.9) into (5.8) to obtain the Laplace transform of I(y) under Policy I and Policy
D for  = 2.
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C.3 Proof of Theorem V.2
For  = 4, we can rewrite B as
B4 = 2
Z R1
0
Z 
0
srddr
s+ (r2 + jjyjj2   2rjjyjj cos )2
= 2
Z R1
0
p
sr
2i
Z 
0
ddr
(r2 + jjyjj2   2rjjyjj cos    ips)
  ddr
(r2 + jjyjj2   2rjjyjj cos  + ips)
(C.11)
Applying Identity 1, we have B4 =

p
s
2i
R R1
0
2rdrpC1  
2rdrpC2 and applying Identity 2, we
have B4 =

p
s
2i
ln
pC1+r2 (ips+jjyjj2)pC2+r2+(ips jjyjj2)
R1
r=0
where C1 = (r2  jjyjj2)2  s  2i
p
s(r2+ jjyjj2)
and C2 = C1 is the complex conjugate of C1. Now, we rewrite C1 as
C1 = (   i )2 = 2    2   2i ; (C.12)
for some real-valued functions (r; s; jjyjj) and  (r; s; jjyjj). For the simplicity of
notation, we also use  and  to represent (r; s; jjyjj) and  (r; s; jjyjj), respectively.
We can then establish the following equation system8><>:
2    2 = (r2   jjyjj2)2   s
 =
p
s(r2 + jjyjj2):
(C.13)
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The functions  and  can be obtained by solving the above equation system. Given
C1 as in (C.12),
B4 =

p
s
2i
ln
 + r2   jjyjj2   i(ps+  )
 + r2   jjyjj2 + i(ps+  )
R1
r=0
(C.14)
=

p
s
2i
ln
1  i
p
s+ 
+r2 jjyjj2
1 + i
p
s+ 
+r2 jjyjj2
R1
r=0
=  ps arctan
p
s+  
 + r2   jjyjj2
R1
r=0
= 
p
s


2
  arctan
p
s+  (R1; s; jjyjj)
(R1; s; jjyjj) +R21   jjyjj2

;
where the last step follows from
lim
r!0
arctan
p
s+ (r; s; jjyjj)
(r; s; jjyjj)+r2 jjyjj2 =limr!0 arctan
p
s+
p
2s
jjyjj2+r2 jjyjj2 =arctan1=

2
:
Similarly, applying Identity 1, we can rewrite C as
C4 =

p
s
2i
Z R2
R1
2rP (r)drpC1
  2rP (r)drpC2
; (C.15)
For Policy E, P (r) = p 2 [0; 1]. Then,
C4 =  p
p
s arctan
p
s+  (r; s; jjyjj)
(r; s; jjyjj) + r2   jjyjj2
R2
r=R1
: (C.16)
Substituting (C.16) and (C.14) into (5.9) in Section 5.2, and then substituting (5.9)
into (5.8) yields the Laplace transform of I(y) under Policy E for  = 4.
Next, P (r) can be written as P (r) = u + vr4, where u =   R41
R42 R41 , v =
1
R42 R41 for
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Policy I, and u =
R42
R42 R41 , v =  
1
R42 R41 for Policy D . Hence,
C4 =

p
s
2i
Z R2
R1
2r(u+ vr4)drpC1
  2r(u+ vr
4)drpC2
dr
t$r2
=

p
s
2i
Z R2
R1
(u+ vt2)dtp
t2   2(ips+ jjyjj2)t+ (jjyjj2   ips)2
  (u+ vt
2)dtp
t2 + 2(i
p
s  jjyjj2)t+ (jjyjj2 + ips)2 ; (C.17)
Next, we have
Z
(u+ vt2)dtp
t2   2(ips+ jjyjj2)t+ (jjyjj2   ips)2
= u
Z
dtp
t2   2(ips+ jjyjj2)t+ (jjyjj2   ips)2
+v
Z
t2dtp
t2   2(ips+ jjyjj2)t+ (jjyjj2   ips)2
(g)
=
v
2
(r2 + 3jjyjj2 + 3ips)(   i )
+(u+ vjjyjj4   vs+ i4vpsjjyjj2) ln
hp
C1 + r2   (i
p
s+ jjyjj2)
i
; (C.18)
where the last step follows after applying Identity 3 in Appendix C.1 and substituting
t with r2. Similarly, we have
Z
(u+ vt2)dtp
t2 + 2(i
p
s  jjyjj2)t+ (jjyjj2 + ips)2
=
v
2
(r2 + 3jjyjj2   3ips)( + i )
+(u+ vjjyjj4   vs  i4vpsjjyjj2) ln
hp
C2 + r2   (i
p
s+ jjyjj2)
i
: (C.19)
Thus, substituting (C.18) and (C.19) into (C.17) and then conducting some alge-
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braic manipulations yields
C4 = 2vsjjyjj2 ln

((r; s; jjyjj) + r2   jjyjj2)2 + (ps+  (r; s; jjyjj))2

(C.20)
 ps
(
v
2

(r2 + 3jjyjj2) (r; s; jjyjj)  3ps(r; s; jjyjj)

+(u+ vjjyjj4   vs) arctan
p
s+  (r; s; jjyjj)
(r; s; jjyjj) + r2   jjyjj2
)
R2
r=R1
:
Finally, we substitute (C.14) and (C.20) into (5.9) in Section 5.2, and then sub-
stitute (5.9) into (5.8) to obtain the Laplace transform of I(y) under Policy I and
Policy D for  = 4.
C.4 Probability Density Function of Rz
The complementrary cdf of FRz (re) of the random distance Rz equals the prob-
ability that no eavesdroppers are in B(o; re) for 0  re  D. Hence, the cdf of Rz
is given by
FRz (re) = 1  FRz (re)
= 1  P (E(B(o; re)) = 0)
= 1 
1X
n=0
P
 
E(B(o; re)) = 0
E(B(o;D)) = nP(E(B(o;D)) = n)
= 1 
1X
n=0

1  r
2
e
D2
n
(eD
2)nexp( eD2)
n!
= 1  exp( eD2)
1X
n=0

1  r
2
e
D2
n
(eD
2)n
n!
= 1  exp( eD2)exp

1  r
2
e
D2

eD
2

= 1  exp( er2e); (C.21)
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for 0  re  D. Therefore, the pdf of Rz is given by
fRz (re) =
8><>:2ereexp( er
2
e); 0  re  D
0; otherwise
:
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